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ABSTRACT—McCleskey v. Kemp, the case that upheld the death penalty
despite undeniable evidence of its racially disparate impact, is indelibly
marked by Justice William Brennan’s phrase, “a fear of too much justice.”
The popular interpretation of this phrase is that the Supreme Court harbored
what I call a “disparity-claim fear,” dreading a future docket of racial
discrimination claims and erecting an impossibly high bar for proving an
equal protection violation. A related interpretation is that the majority had a
“color-consciousness fear” of remedying discrimination through raceremedial policies. In contrast to these conventional views, I argue that the
primary anxiety exhibited by the McCleskey majority was a “leniency fear”
of death penalty abolition. Opinion author Justice Lewis Powell made clear
his view that execution was the appropriate punishment for McCleskey’s
crime and expressed worry that McCleskey’s victory would open the door to
challenges of criminal sentences more generally. Understanding that the
Court’s primary political sensitivity was to state penal authority, not racial
hierarchy, complicates the progressive sentiment that McCleskey’s call-toaction is securing equality of punishment. Derrick Bell’s “interest
convergence” theory predicts that even conservatives with an aversion to
robust equal protection law will accept racial-disparity evidence when in the
service of crime-control values. Indeed, Justice Powell may have been more
sanguine about McCleskey’s discrimination claim had mandatory capital
punishment been an option. Accordingly, I caution that, outside of the death
penalty context, courts and lawmakers can address perceived punishment
disparities through “level-up” remedies, such as mandatory minimum
sentences or abolishing diversion (which is said to favor white defendants).
There are numerous examples of convergence between antidiscrimination
and prosecutorial interests, including mandatory sentencing guidelines,
aggressive domestic violence policing and prosecution, and the movement
to abolish Stand-Your-Ground laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Every year, professors of criminal, constitutional, and
antidiscrimination law introduce students to the case that established the
popular claim, “The death penalty is racist.” Every year, students are
surprised to find out that the racial picture of the death penalty that emerges
from that case, McCleskey v. Kemp,1 is more vexing and complex than they
had anticipated. In popular consciousness, capital punishment is racist
because African-American defendants are the primary recipients of its
barbaric practices, and this is certainly part of the story. The brutal history of
state-imposed and tolerated application of the death penalty to Southern
Blacks, regardless of guilt and through the most sadistic means like beatings
and lynching, will forever be a conspicuous stain on the fabric of the United
States. However, McCleskey involved a different formulation of the racially
discriminatory application of the death penalty. The famous “Baldus study”
introduced by the defendant’s attorneys found that black defendants in
Georgia were generally less likely to receive death sentences than white
defendants, and that the racial discrimination related to the race of the

1

481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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victim.2 Prosecutors, and to a lesser extent jurors, displayed a tendency to
undervalue black life and overvalue white life by condemning to death only
those murderers who dared to deny that white lives matter.3
Every five to ten years, legal scholars dust off their copies of
McCleskey, or download fresh ones, and re-engage with the intricacies of the
majority and dissenting opinions for anniversary symposia. McCleskey v.
Kemp has been such an ubiquitous ground for legal postulating, posturing,
and prophesizing that one writer for a twenty-fifth anniversary symposium
in 2012 remarked that “little more can be said” about the case.4 The case is
indeed singular. It singularly preserved the ultimate punishment, a “peculiar
institution” and outlier in barbarity in the world.5 It singularly foreclosed
racial disparity arguments in criminal sentences in general, a fact particularly
salient today given that the criminal system is a, if not the, primary site of
racial injustice in America.6 The case is also a singularly stunning piece of
legal literature. Justice William Brennan’s dissent’s devastating critique of
capital punishment is a goldmine of philosophical, historical, and legal
insight. It is here that we find the evocative characterization of the majority’s
position as “a fear of too much justice”—the focus of this Symposium.7
Throughout the years, legal scholars have offered various accounts of
the fear of justice that underlay the McCleskey majority’s preservation of the
death penalty. One of the most common critiques of the majority opinion
centers on author Justice Lewis Powell’s treatment of the equal protection
doctrine and the impossibly high burden for circumstantial proof of Georgia
state actors’ discriminatory intent. The fact that Powell required “smoking
gun” proof of discriminatory animus undergirds the common scholarly
sentiment that the primary fear in the majority opinion is that of racial
discrimination claims.8 I will call this the “disparity-claim fear.” A related
2

See infra notes 39–52 and accompanying text.
See David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the
Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 707–09 (1983).
4
G. Ben Cohen, McCleskey’s Omission: The Racial Geography of Retribution, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 65 (2012).
5
See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF
ABOLITION (2010). After McCleskey, the Supreme Court entertained challenges related to the
characteristics of the defendant, method of execution, and procedures used for determining a death
sentence, but did not entertain challenges to the death penalty as a whole or revisit the racial issue based
on new statistical evidence. See infra note 261.
6
Carol S. Steiker, The Marshall Hypothesis Revisited, 52 HOW. L.J. 525, 547 (2009).
7
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8
See Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 443 (1988); Jeffrey
Fagan & Mukul Bakhshi, New Frameworks for Racial Equality in the Criminal Law, 39 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007); Christopher J. Schmidt, Analyzing the Text of the Equal Protection Clause: Why
the Definition of “Equal” Requires a Disproportionate Impact Analysis When Laws Unequally Affect
3
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argument is that the majority harbored a colorblindness-driven apprehension
of race-conscious remedies, such as requiring prosecutors to account for the
racial distribution of their pursuit of capital punishment.9 I will call this the
“color-consciousness fear.”
My contribution concentrates on a related yet separate remedial fear
that is so obvious as to seem banal: the fear of abolishing the death penalty—
and the concurrent fear that McCleskey’s success would pave the way for
defendants to challenge non-capital sentences, undermining U.S. criminal
authority generally.10 The Court refused to accept the disparity evidence in
this case, not primarily because it had an unremitting and immovable
aversion to claims of racial disproportion. Rather, having previously taken
mandatory capital punishment off the table and being unwilling to engage in
color-conscious social engineering, the only real remedy left was abolition,
something Justice Powell was, at that time, unwilling to endorse. And
indeed, he feared that if disparity claims presaged leniency in this case, they
could very well do so across the board. I will call this the “leniency fear.”
Understanding the centrality of carceral sentiments in McCleskey is
particularly important in this age of mass incarceration. The salience of
McCleskey endures precisely because it forms the basis for various social
justice-based and legally progressive political strategies.11 The focus on the
McCleskey Court’s disparity-claim fear prefigures a common progressive
sensibility that legal success, if not justice itself, occurs whenever
decisionmakers accept and remedy identity-based disparities. If, however,
we understand that the Court’s primary political sensitivity was to the
possibility of a broad assault on the penal authority of the state, it counsels a
more cautious approach to asserting disparity claims and evidence. Viewing
the “fear of too much justice” as a fear of leniency indicates that legal
decisionmakers are often more sanguine about discrimination claims when
Racial Minorities, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 140 (2002); Paul Schoeman, Easing the Fear of
Too Much Justice: A Compromise Proposal to Revise the Racial Justice Act, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
543, 551 (1995); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 158 (1987).
9
See Ian F. Haney López, Is the “Post” in Post-Racial the “Blind” in Colorblind?, 32 CARDOZO L.
REV. 807, 815 (2011); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, “Multiracial” Discourse: Racial Classifications in an
Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 141 (1998); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v.
Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988); R. Richard
Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse,
48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1120 (2001).
10
Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial
Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 510 (1994).
11
McCleskey is thus symbolically representative of judicial blindness toward evidence of racial
discrimination, against which critical race scholars, activists, and lawyers must struggle. In turn, the
central goal of many equality scholars becomes achieving equality of punishment, not necessarily less
punishment, in any given area. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8; infra notes 238–250 and
accompanying text.
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they can address them through greater penal severity and without colorconscious social engineering. Accordingly, one should be vigilant of what
Professor Derrick Bell famously termed “interest convergence,” the
phenomenon of racial justice remedies succeeding when they reflect the
agendas of empowered lawmakers and constituencies.12
The rest of this Essay proceeds in three parts. The first Part sets the
stage for an analysis of McCleskey by examining the jurisprudential setting
in which the Petitioner, death row inmate Warren McCleskey, and his
NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) attorneys asserted their disparity claims.
It was a setting involving rejection and requirement of discretion, where both
optional and mandatory capital punishment had been ruled unconstitutional.
Part II is an intricate exegesis of the McCleskey majority opinion. After
considering the explanations that the Court’s opinion reflects an overarching
aversion to racial disparity claims and color-conscious policies, I make the
case that the majority’s primary “fear of justice” was the fear of tempering
penal authority. In Part III, I caution that, outside of the capital context,
lawmakers can address racial disparities by “leveling-up” punishment. They
can, for example, address disproportional leniency toward those who offend
against black victims by mandating high minimum sentences. Indeed, the
feminist experience with domestic violence criminalization underscores how
easily progressive formal-equality projects transform into simple law-andorder policies.
I.

SETTING THE JURISPRUDENTIAL STAGE:
CERTAINTY VERSUS LENIENCY

A. The Janus Face of Death Penalty Discretion
Much of the younger generation does not realize that the American
death penalty was at one time unconstitutional. In 1972, Georgia, the state
upon which the seeds of death penalty jurisprudence have largely been sown,
faced a challenge in the Supreme Court by three black defendants.13 Two of
the defendants were sentenced to death for rape, while Furman, an occasional
psychotic with “convulsive disorder,” was condemned for murder.14 The
resulting Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia was a tapestry of
12
DERRICK A. BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED
HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 165–79 (2004); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
13
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). I begin my history with Furman, although death penalty
controversies and the NAACP’s LDF strategies began far before. See Arthur J. Goldberg, Memorandum
to the Conference Re: Capital Punishment, October Term, 1963, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 493 (1986) (arguing
in a 1963 memo that capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment).
14
Furman, 408 U.S. at 252–53.
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judicial opinions: Two Justices, Justice Brennan and Justice Thurgood
Marshall, argued that capital punishment per se violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment;15 three
Justices, Justice William Douglas, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Byron
White, reserved on the question of the general constitutionality of the death
penalty, but rejected Georgia’s scheme that left capital punishment to the
unfettered discretion of the jury as “wanton[] and . . . freakish[]”16 and
“pregnant with discrimination;”17 the remaining four Justices dissented,18
with Justice Warren Burger opining that the majority usurped legislatures’
power to determine criminal sentences.19 Of note here, Justice Powell, the
McCleskey majority opinion’s future author, dissented separately to
emphasize his disagreement with Justices Brennan and Marshall that capital
punishment’s “evolutionary process ha[d] come suddenly to an end.”20
Powell painted a picture of an America besieged by crime, noting the
“brutish and revolting murders [that] continue to occur with disquieting
frequency[,] . . . the several senseless assassinations[,] [and] the too
numerous shocking multiple murders that have stained this country’s recent
history.”21 Compare this with fellow dissenter Justice Harry Blackmun, who
averred to Burger’s restraint-oriented sentiments but emphasized his own
“distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty.”22
The execution-free moment in Supreme Court jurisprudence proved
short-lived. Just four years later, in three 1976 companion cases—Gregg v.
Georgia,23 Proffitt v. Florida,24 and Jurek v. Texas25—a majority of Justices,
including Powell, declared that the states’ revised statutory schemes, which
provided guided discretion to the jury, cured the death penalty’s
constitutional infirmity.26 Justices Brennan and Marshall, now the lone
voices of abolition, reiterated their Furman sentiments.27 Although many
states moved to guided discretion exemplified by Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek,

15

Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 358–59 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
17
Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
18
Id. at 375–479 (Burger, Blackmun, Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting separately).
19
Id. at 383–84 (Burger, J., dissenting).
20
Id. at 430–31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
21
Id. at 444–45 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also id. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing rape
as “sordid, heinous[,] . . . demeaning, humiliating, and often physically or psychologically traumatic”).
22
Id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
23
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
24
428 U.S. 242 (1976).
25
428 U.S. 262 (1976).
26
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196–98.
27
See id. at 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16

1342

112:1337 (2018)

Equal Protection Under the Carceral State

a few states responded to Furman’s prohibition of unfettered discretion
through level-up measures mandating capital punishment for certain crimes.
This produced another set of 1976 companion cases, Roberts v. Louisiana28
and Woodson v. North Carolina,29 reviewing the constitutionality of
mandatory capital punishment. The revival of mandatory executions moved
Powell toward a measure of mercy, and he joined in striking the schemes
down.
Justice Powell’s turn toward temperance might seem curious in light of
his Furman dissent’s anticrime sentences and impassioned defense of
legislative prerogative. Nevertheless, he had also expressed a special
fondness for “case by case” analysis and jury discretion.30 Such sentiments
animated the Woodson plurality’s main reasoning that because a death
sentence is so exceptional, it requires jurors to assess the “character and
record of the individual offender.”31 The plurality’s second rationale was
somewhat confounding given this unwavering trust in juries to prudently
manage the magnitudinous death decision. It asserted that mandatory
systems were untenable because juries could not be trusted to make lawful
decisions about first-degree murder liability, leading to widespread and
arbitrary nullification.32 Woodson’s reasoning betrays a sensibility on the part
of the plurality that mandatory executions, a vestige of antiquated premodern
punishment, are simply inconsistent with “contemporary community values”
regarding the administration of justice.33 By contrast, discretionary execution
comports with contemporary rectitude when imagined to be imposed by a
thoughtful, presumptively nonracist, and thoroughly modern jury.34 Read
with Furman and Gregg, the Roberts/Woodson holdings made for tricky
legal terrain to navigate. The Court both forbade and mandated discretion.35
It was between this rock and hard place that the administration of capital
punishment persisted, now under guided discretion systems where juries
were to weigh statutory aggravating factors ranging from concrete
(committing an enumerated felony) to vague (“heinousness”) against
28

428 U.S. 325 (1976).
428 U.S. 280 (1976).
30
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 430, 440 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
31
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
32
Id. at 302–03.
33 Id. at 295 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)).
34
Id. at 295–296.
35
See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 382 (1995)
(discussing this tension); Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital
Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 990 (1996) (noting the complexity of the role of mercy in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence).
29
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mitigating evidence presented by the defendant.36 To be sure, the Court
struggled with exactly how to reconcile Furman’s prohibition of
arbitrariness and Roberts/Woodson’s principle that death penalty decisions
must be personalized, a principle that reached its pinnacle in the 1978
decision, Lockett v. Ohio, where the Court quite surprisingly required states
to allow unlimited mitigating evidence.37 Professors Jordan Steiker and Carol
Steiker survey the terrain, concluding: “Th[e] tension between Gregg’s
seeming insistence on channeling [jury discretion] and Woodson’s seeming
insistence on uncircumscribed consideration of mitigating evidence
constitutes the central dilemma in post-Furman capital punishment law.”38
B. McCleskey and the Baldus Study
McCleskey v. Kemp posed the most serious constitutional challenge to
capital punishment writ large since Furman. Ruminating on that challenge’s
failure, a death penalty critic might lament the providence of timing that
designated Warren McCleskey the face of abolition.39 McCleskey had
murdered a police officer, a fact that would garner little sympathy from
swing justices, particularly Justice Powell whose law-and-order sentiments
were on full display in Furman.40 Justice Powell, in fact, confirmed this
disposition in a memo to his clerks after the McCleskey oral argument,
remarking, “[t]he opponents of capital punishment hardly could have picked
a weaker case for this argument. Petitioner planned the armed robbery, was
the trigger man, he shot an officer twice, and had a substantial record of other
serious felonies. He identified no mitigating circumstances.”41

36
See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 866 (1983) (discussing aggravating factors); Steiker & Steiker,
supra note 35 at 374, 382.
37
438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978) (striking down limits on what capital sentencers could consider as a
mitigating factor). One might wonder whether the holding related to the fact that Lockett was a woman.
See id. at 590. The Court’s treatment of aggravating factors fared little better, allowing the jury unfettered
discretion once it narrowed the pool by finding an aggravator. Zant, 462 U.S. at 416 (upholding death
sentence where capital jury relied on both valid and invalid aggravating factors). See also Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 652–55 (1990) (holding that the “especially heinous, cruel, or depraved”
aggravating factor was not unconstitutionally vague because judges could interpret it narrowly).
38
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 35, at 382.
39
See Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from the
Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1035, 1043 (1994)
(calling McCleskey a “seemingly sociopathic armed robber [who] had killed a police officer”). In 2008,
when I was a colleague of David Baldus at the University of Iowa, he remarked to me in passing that he
believed the case would have been decided differently had McCleskey not been a cop killer.
40
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
41
Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Leslie &
Ronald 3 (Nov. 1, 1986) [hereinafter Powell Memo to Leslie & Ronald] (located in Justice Powell’s
McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law Library at 111–
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Nevertheless, McCleskey involved a black-on-white killing, and in
Furman, several Justices, including Powell, invited litigants with compelling
evidence of racial discrimination to present claims under the Equal
Protection Clause.42 A 1983 study by law professors David Baldus and
Charles Pulaski and statistician George Woodworth would serve as a basis
for the LDF lawyers’ acceptance of that invitation.43 The study, among other
things, tested the efficacy of a particular safeguard touted in Gregg, the
requirement that the Georgia Supreme Court determine whether a death
sentence is “excessive or disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar
cases,” called “proportionality” or “comparative sentencing” review.44 The
researchers obtained the case files for all the murder convictions in Georgia
from 1973 to 1978 to determine whether the Georgia Supreme Court had
been correct to rule all the death sentences proportionate.45 The good news
for Georgia was that its system was not completely unpredictable, as
increased aggravation did correlate with increased probability of a death
sentence.46 However, a significant portion of death sentences (13–22%) were
“presumptively excessive” in that a substantial majority of similar cases did
not result in death.47
The study also revealed a disparity that would forever mark the death
penalty as racist. The white race of a victim was highly predictive of death,
even when controlling for aggravation level.48 Prosecutors required fewer
aggravating factors to send white-victim cases to juries, and juries required
fewer factors to sentence those killers to death. The authors concluded, “our
data strongly suggests that Georgia is operating a dual system, based upon
the race of the victim, for processing homicide cases.”49 Baldus and
colleagues conducted a follow-up study,50 and by the time the two studies
(collectively called “the Baldus study”) appeared in the McCleskey litigation,
they included data from over 2000 cases with analyses of over 400 individual

15),
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles
[https://perma.cc/8G5R-FK56].
42
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 449 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
43
See Baldus et al., supra note 3.
44
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 205–06 (1976).
45
Baldus et al., supra note 3, at 679, 711.
46
Id. at 702.
47
Id. at 704–06. Between only 50% and 30% were “presumptively evenhanded.” Id. “Presumptively
evenhanded” death sentences were those where 80% or more of similar cases resulted in death. Id. at 698.
48
Id. at 709–10.
49
Id.
50
See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990) (describing the methodology and results of their second “Charging and
Sentencing Study” of death sentences in Georgia).
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factors that contributed to capital decisions.51 The Baldus study found not
only “stark” racial differences in death penalty distribution—the death
penalty was assessed in 1% of black-victim cases, 11% of white-victim
cases, and 22% of white-victim cases with black killers—but also that white
victimhood was more predictive of death than some aggravating factors,
including a prior record of murder.52
It is now prosaic to say that the Baldus study was “groundbreaking,”
but it is difficult to overstate the precision and comprehensiveness of the
evidence as compared to statistical proof in past cases.53 Considering the
character of the empirical work, along with the testimony in the record from
a famed statistician that the study was “far and away the most complete and
thorough analysis of sentencing” ever conducted,54 it is shocking that the
Georgia federal district judge found the Baldus study so lacking in validity
that it could “demonstrate nothing.”55 While a refutation of district court
Judge J. Owen Forrester’s analysis is beyond the scope of this Essay, the
district court decision reminds us that faith can always triumph over fact.
Just as the extremely religious characterize evolution as a “theory” that lacks
exacting proof while simultaneously eschewing the need for evidence of
creation, those with colorblind faith that criminal punishment is fair demand
undeniable, ironclad, and, indeed, unobtainable proof of discrimination,
while offering none that the system is just.56
The Eleventh Circuit declined to test statistical wits with Baldus and
company and instead presumed that the study was valid. Like the district
court, the court of appeals was unimpressed, but its skepticism related to the
study’s findings. The Baldus study revealed that the whiteness of the victim
alone increased the defendant’s chance of being sentenced to death from 5%
to 11%, more than doubling the risk of death. The appeals court wrote off
this increase as “not sufficient,” incorrectly characterizing it as showing a
six percent difference, rather than a six point difference, and noting that “[i]n
any discretionary system, some imprecision must be tolerated.”57 In fact, the
appeals court saw the Baldus study as vindication that the system was

51
Samuel R. Gross, David Baldus and the Legacy of McCleskey v. Kemp, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1905,
1911–12 (2012).
52
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–87, 326–28 (1987).
53
Gross, supra note 51, at 1911.
54
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 908 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
55
McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 379 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
56
See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 360 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (stating that “[t]he State did not test its
hypothesis to determine if white-victim and black-victim cases at the same level of aggravating
circumstances were similarly treated”).
57
McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 897.
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“operating in a rational manner,” despite the little glitch that a victim’s white
race increased the defendant’s death probability, not by 6%, but by 120%.58
The Supreme Court similarly assumed the statistical validity of the
Baldus study but did not endorse it as proof of discrimination.59 By the time
the case reached the High Court, the defense had amassed unassailable
evidence of the study’s comprehensiveness and legitimacy.60 Leading U.S.
criminologists described it as “among the best empirical studies on criminal
sentencing ever conducted.”61 At least one Justice joining the majority,
however, did not doubt the validity of the study as proof of discrimination.
In 1993, the private papers of Thurgood Marshall became public, and among
them was a bombshell that David Baldus later remarked “had taken his
breath away.”62 In a 1987 memo to the Conference, junior Justice Antonin
Scalia stated:
I plan to join Lewis’s [Powell’s] opinion in this case, with two reservations. I
disagree with the argument that the inferences that can be drawn from the
Baldus study are weakened by the fact that each jury and each trial is unique,
or by the large number of variables at issue. And I do not share the view, implicit
in the opinion, that an effect of racial factors upon sentencing, if it could only
be shown by sufficiently strong statistical evidence, would require reversal.
Since it is my view that unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial
decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable,
I cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof. I expect to write separately
to make these points, but not until I see the dissent.63

Perhaps Powell’s reluctance to endorse the study stemmed from the
belief that the “Court should not be the forum for an extensive review of
statistical techniques.”64 Alternatively, he may have sought to allow the
58

See id. at 896–97.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.7, 292–99.
60
Gross, supra note 51, at 1914.
61
Brief for Dr. Franklin M. Fisher, Dr. Richard O. Lempert, Dr. Peter W. Sperlich, Dr. Marvin E.
Wolfgang, Professor Hans Zeisel & Professor Franklin E. Zimring as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 3, McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (No. 84-6811).
62
Dorin, supra note 39, at 1039.
63
Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to the Conference,
McCleskey v. Kemp (Jan. 6, 1987) (located in Justice Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with
Washington & Lee University School of Law Library at 148), http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles [https://perma.cc/8G5R-FK56].
64
Bench Memorandum from Leslie to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the
U.S., 8 (Oct. 1, 1986) (located in Justice Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with Washington
&
Lee
University
School
of
Law
Library
at
36–59),
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles
[https://perma.cc/8G5R-FK56]. Powell underlines this sentence and writes “I agree!” in the margin. Id.
59
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majority to maintain the pretense of not really knowing whether there was
discrimination, as opposed to admitting, as Scalia did, that they knew
Georgia discriminated but just did not care.65 I suspect, however, that Justice
Powell eschewed extended exploration of the statistics because he just could
not fathom how general race-of-victim disparities invalidated the specific
sentence given to McCleskey, a convicted cop killer. In an early memo to his
clerk, Powell ruminated:
At the outset, it is not at all clear to me that Baldus is even relevant to this case.
McCleskey confessed to participating in a planned and armed robbery. . . . At
the sentencing hearing, the jury found two statutory aggravating circumstances:
the murder was committed in the course of another capital felony; and the victim
had been a police officer engaged in the performance of his duties. McCleskey
offered no mitigating evidence. In these circumstances, it is not easy to believe
that general statistics only could be relevant to whether McCleskey was guilty
of a capital offense for which death is a proper punishment under Georgia law.66

The Justice emphasized the lens of legitimacy through which he viewed
capital punishment and the jaundiced eye he cast toward any wholesale
assault on the institution: “This case presents, as we know, an attack on
capital punishment itself. . . . It will not be easy for me to accept this view.”67
II. A FEAR OF TOO MUCH LENIENCY
Before I proceed to dissect the McCleskey majority opinion and
reconfigure it in a manner that supports my thesis, as law professors are wont
to do, a serious caveat on methodology is warranted. It is often an exercise
in aspiration, speculation, and even futility to seek to divine the motivations
of individual Supreme Court Justices. I certainly do not mean to
psychologize or biograph Justice Powell, the latter having been done with
care by John C. Jeffries.68 Nor do I engage in a court-watcher’s analytic of
larger Supreme Court trends, transformations, or partisanship.69 My goal and
65

I thank Carol Steiker for this point.
Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. to Leslie 2–3
(Sept. 16, 1986) [hereinafter Powell Memo to Leslie] (located in Justice Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp
Case File on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law Library at 28–33),
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles
[https://perma.cc/8G5R-FK56].
67
Id. at 6.
68
See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994).
69
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT (2014); JEFFREY
TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT (2007); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985). For a recent empirical look at the politics of the courts, although not
the Supreme Court in particular, see Dan M. Kahan et. al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An
Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349,
351 (2016).
66
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method is far more modest: to divine the meaning of the opinion from an
inspection of the opinion itself, other relevant decisions, and statements of
the Justices, particularly Justice Powell. Of course, there is a fine line
between analysis and psychoanalysis, and case history must attend to the
concerns of historiography, but I hope not to wade into those murky waters.
Instead, the following is an effort to put McCleskey’s jurisprudential pieces
together in a new, but not novel, way, adhering to the norms of case
interpretation in legal scholarship.
A. The Disparity-Claim Fear
Justice Powell’s relatively terse and dispassionate opinion commences
with the admonition that an equal protection violation requires proof of
“discriminatory purpose,” not general impact.70 Significantly, however,
Powell immediately qualified that intent can be established through
statistical evidence of disparity.71 He further opined that a “stark” pattern of
disparity can constitute the “sole proof of discriminatory intent” and that in
certain cases the Court will find a violation “even when the statistical pattern
does not approach . . . extremes.”72 This language reads as promising for the
Petitioner, yet by the end of the equal protection section, the opinion has
erected the onerous requirement of “exceptionally clear proof” of
discrimination.73 Powell opines that under such a standard, “the Baldus study
is clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers
in McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory purpose.”74
Perhaps the exacting standard of proof reflects Justice Powell’s desire
to short circuit discriminatory pattern and practice jurisprudence and
entrench Washington v. Davis’s bright line between discriminatory intent
and impact.75 In this view, Powell’s overarching fear was one of too much
racial justice, the type secured through the disparate impact analysis.76
However, a newfound distaste for discriminatory pattern evidence would
have been a stunning reversal for a jurist who, just the year before, authored
Batson v. Kentucky, the most important antidiscrimination case to date.77
Batson was, at that time, quite singular in its forthright embrace of pattern

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987).
Id. at 293.
Id. at 293–94.
Id. at 297.
Id.
426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 316; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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evidence to prove discriminatory intent.78 In Batson, Justice Powell took up
the issue of racially biased peremptory strikes.79 Criminal attorneys had long
enjoyed a privilege of absolute discretion in striking a certain number of
jurors, without regard to “cause” and without explanation, and, to many,
discretionary peremptory strikes represented a bedrock principle of fair
procedure. 80
Batson asserted that the prosecutor in his case engaged in racial
discrimination by excluding African-Americans from the jury. In assessing
Batson’s argument, Powell articulated the famous standard for proving
discriminatory purpose through circumstantial evidence:
[A defendant] may make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by
showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose. Once the defendant makes the requisite showing, the
burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion. The State
cannot meet this burden on mere general assertions that its officials did not
discriminate or that they properly performed their official duties. Rather, the
State must demonstrate that “permissible racially neutral selection criteria and
procedures have produced the monochromatic result.”81

Far from requiring smoking-gun proof, Batson specified that a prima
facie case of petit jury selection discrimination could be established simply
by a prosecutor’s “pattern” of excluding African-Americans from the jury.82
This history does not readily support the thesis that Powell had an
overwhelming fear of racial disparity evidence.83
In McCleskey, Justice Powell did not in fact withdraw support for the
admission of pattern evidence in jury selection cases, or in housing, voting,
and employment discrimination cases.84 Instead, he took pains to distinguish

78
See James J. Tomkovicz, Twenty-Five Years of Batson: An Introduction to Equal Protection
Regulation of Peremptory Jury Challenges, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1393, 1403 (2012) (calling Batson’s
lowering of threshold for proof of petit jury selection discrimination a “dramatic, revolutionary step”).
The case proved less revolutionary in practice, as judges routinely accept prosecutors’ weak explanations
for their strikes. See infra note 95.
79
Batson, 476 U.S at 82.
80
See id. at 133 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he peremptory challenge that is part of the fabric of
our jury system should not be casually cast aside . . . .”).
81
Id. at 93–94 (internal citations omitted).
82
Id. at 96–97.
83
Powell’s McCleskey case file papers reveal that he was particularly attuned to differentiating
between civil discrimination cases and discrimination claims in criminal cases. His remarks on the draft
opinion from his clerk, states, “I am inclined to rely in the text of our opinion only—or primarily—on
criminal cases that have placed the burden of proving this discrimination on the particular defendant.”
Powell Memo to Leslie & Ronald, supra note 41.
84
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293–94 (1987).
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McCleskey based on the “[t]he unique nature of the decisions at issue in this
case.”85 This invited a blistering rejoinder from Justice Blackmun in dissent:
The Court today seems to give a new meaning to our recognition that death is
different. Rather than requiring a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of
the capital sentencing determination, the Court relies on the very fact that this
is a case involving capital punishment to apply a lesser standard of scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.86

Justice Powell offered weak analytical support for distinguishing
capital process from the jury selection process. To be sure, the doctrinal
history of the two processes reveals the death penalty a far likelier candidate
for equal protection regulation than peremptory strikes. In capital
jurisprudence, the courts had long problematized decisionmakers’ discretion
and set forth parameters to channel it. By contrast, peremptory challenges’
entire point is to provide prosecutors and defense attorneys an alternative to
for-cause strikes and allow them a measure of unfettered jury-empaneling
discretion. Given that Batson had established the necessity and propriety of
requiring prosecutors to articulate race-neutral reasons for peremptorily
striking a juror, why did Powell consider it wholly inappropriate to require
capital prosecutors to articulate race-neutral reasons for seeking a
defendant’s death?
Powell could fairly object to any implication that courts could secondguess capital jury decisionmaking or require jurors to articulate post-verdict
race-neutral explanations for their death sentences, relying on the
longstanding precept that jury secrecy is sacrosanct. However, while courts
may be precluded from probing jurors’ minds for evidence of discrimination,
Batson makes clear that prosecutors enjoy no such immunity.87 Faced with
the reality that prosecutorial decisionmaking is not sacrosanct, the
McCleskey opinion, remarkably, hinges its distinction between prosecutors
seeking strikes and seeking deaths on the gossamer thread of time, referring
solely to “the impropriety of our requiring prosecutors to defend their
decisions to seek death penalties, often years after they were made.”88 But
this distinction is unexplained and inexplicable. Batson challenges can also
occur years after conviction—case in point, 2016’s Foster v. Chatman,
where the Supreme Court upheld a Batson challenge to a jury in a 1986
murder trial that occurred just four months after Batson was decided.89

85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
Id. at 347–48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 348–49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 296 (majority opinion) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016).
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The Court also opined that death penalty decisions involve more
variables than jury selection, employment, housing, and voting decisions.90
Even if this conclusory assumption were correct, it would not refute that
Baldus and his colleagues actually addressed the multiple variable
phenomenon—hundreds of them—in a manner that far exceeded the breadth
and depth of the proof found sufficient in past discrimination cases.91 Indeed,
the Batson prima facie case is established simply by asserting that a
prosecutor created a white jury through striking black jurors, without any
empirical evidence attesting to whether or how much the factor of race,
among the infinite reasons, predicted prosecutorial strikes. Yet, evidence of
Georgia prosecutors’ virtual non-prosecution of black victim cases combined
with exacting statistical evidence that race played a role in their decisions
was “clearly insufficient.”92
Why did Justice Powell try so hard to shut down McCleskey’s disparity
challenge, when it was he who created the very Batson framework?93 The
answer lies in the respective challenges’ relationship to state criminal
authority. Powell understood that Batson called for “case-by-case”
resolutions of disputes through re-empaneling juries or, in the extreme case,
retrial.94 Such a blip on prosecutors’ paths toward securing convictions was
a small price to pay for vindicating racial equality.95 By contrast, McCleskey
presented institutional stakes of a wholly different magnitude. As Justice
John Paul Stevens noted, Powell feared that a favorable ruling “would sound
the death knell for capital punishment in Georgia.”96 Powell’s earliest case
memo queried whether acceptance of the Baldus study would require that no
black defendant be sentenced to death when their victim was white.97
Justice Blackmun, in fact, worked through the application of the Batson
framework to McCleskey’s case in his dissent. However, his conclusion
could only serve to confirm Powell’s anxieties over abolition. Blackmun
90

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295.
See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
92
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
93
See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
94
Powell Memo to Leslie & Ronald, supra note 41, at 2–3.
95
Batson did not prevent racialized mass incarceration and its application to defense attorneys may
have rendered it marginally more punitive than protective. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48–
50 (1992) (applying the Batson framework to defendants’ peremptory strikes); Daniel R. Pollitt &
Brittany P. Warren, Thirty Years of Disappointment: North Carolina’s Remarkable Appellate Batson
Record, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1957, 1963–64 (2016) (examining thirty years of Batson litigation in North
Carolina and concluding that Batson has proven “toothless” at preventing discriminatory jury strikes,
which is especially disturbing “in light of the dubious reasons North Carolina prosecutors routinely give
for their peremptory challenges of minority jurors”).
96
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97
See Powell Memo to Leslie & Ronald, supra note 41, at 3–4.
91
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opined that whenever a black defendant convicted of killing a white victim
brought a challenge, the state had to articulate a compelling “countervailing
theory” of the racial disparity. Given the “magnitude” of the Baldus study,
prosecutors would generally be unable make an adequate case that their
decisions were free of racial bias.98 This implied that every defendant in a
white victim case would have a successful Batson-like challenge until
Georgia modified its system.99 Indeed, during oral argument, LDF attorney
Jack Boger drew a straight line to Furman’s moratorium, stating that “like
Furman,” Georgia’s system “is not operating evenhandedly . . . [and]
need[s] [to] be struck.”100 In the end, Powell’s carve-out for capital
punishment in discrimination jurisprudence stemmed from his belief that
equal protection liberality in capital punishment, unlike in jury selection,
would be too great an assault on carceral authority for the state to bear.101
B. The Color-Consciousness Fear
A separate but related explanation for the Court’s dismissal of
McCleskey’s equal protection claim emphasizes, not the Court’s resistance
to evidence of disparity, but the Justices’ concern that accepting such
evidence would require the Court to compel prosecutors to engage in a colorconscious calibration of their capital decisions. Although, as discussed
above, some of the dissenters imagined that Georgia’s capital punishment
system could, after a Furman-like chrysalis phase, emerge metamorphosed,
the question of how to reign in discriminatory victim-valuation while
preserving individualized decisionmaking remained intractable. One might
reason that the racial disparity issue militated in favor of mandatory capital
punishment in select cases, but that had been foreclosed by
Roberts/Woodson.102 However, this constitutionally required discretion,
crafted in the name of civilized modernity, was also an avenue for retrograde
racist sentiments to enter into the capital process.
During oral argument, the Justices struggled with this new rock-andhard-place between desirable individuation and unacceptable discrimination.

98

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 359, 361 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Blackmun suggested Stevens-like narrowing and also suggested that prosecutor guidelines might
save the system. Id. at 365.
100
Oral Argument at 15:22, McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (No. 84-6811),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1986/84-6811 [https://perma.cc/H7TE-294W].
101
James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment,
1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85–86 (2007) (suggesting this as a “less charitabl[e]” view).
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See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
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Justice Powell only spoke to emphasize McCleskey’s “serious offense,”103
but other Justices were preoccupied with this “tension:”
O’Connor:
So this Court’s cases that have, since Furman, opened up to
allow more discretion, were wrongly decided, and we should move back toward
less discretion?
Boger:
Not necessarily. They were based on the hope . . . they were
based on the strong presumption . . . that [states] could carry out those statutes
without racial discrimination. . . .

....
Scalia:
[W]hat procedure could have been inserted that would have
solved that problem, other than the one that Justice O’Connor has suggested,
that is, going back to a rigid system where a certain crime, felony murder,
produces the death penalty?104

Various commentators offered suggestions for a system that would
reduce Georgia’s disparities while preserving discretionary capital
punishment,105 the most enduring of which can be found in Justice Stevens’s
dissent. Noting that the Baldus study found little racial disparity in the highly
aggravated murder category, which did not include McCleskey’s “midlevel” murder, Justice Stevens suggested limiting death eligibility to those
extreme cases.106 Today, attorney Boger ruminates on whether he should
have emphasized Stevens’ remedy.107 However, the features of this system
that would remedy discrimination—the rare-but-guaranteed nature of
execution—also render it unacceptable to both abolitionists and death
103
Justice Powell asked, “So this defendant was found guilty of shooting a police officer while he
was in the process of committing a robbery[?]” Attorney Boger responded in part, “It’s no doubt, Justice
Powell, that’s a serious offense,” to which Powell replied, “Right.” Oral Argument at 21:45, supra note
100.
104
Oral Argument at 26:25, supra note 100 (first ellipsis in original).
105
These range from narrowing to “super due process.” See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 35,
at 414–26.
106
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367. I hasten to add that in recent years, the idea of drastically narrowing
the pool of death-eligible murderers while simultaneously making death virtually mandatory for that class
has gained a measure of support from the many who believe that the system “worked” in the Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev (Boston bomber) and Dylann Roof (racist church killer) cases. See Richard A. Serrano, Death
Sentence for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Brings Relief to Many in Boston, L.A. TIMES (May 15, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-boston-tsarnaev-sentence-20150512-story.html
[https://perma.cc/2DGL-ZQE5]; Malcolm Graham, Viewpoint, Sparing Dylann Roof the Death Penalty
Says
White
Lives
Matter
More,
CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER
(Aug.
30,
2016),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/op-ed/article98836492.html [https://perma.cc/P28C-YY8D].
The brother of one of Roof’s victims reasoned that sparing Dylann Roof the death penalty says “[w]hite
lives matter more and that white victims matter more.” Id.
107
Discussion with Jack Boger, Wade Edwards Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina (Nov. 20, 2017).
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penalty supporters. Justices Brennan and Marshall did not endorse Stevens’s
suggestion that capital punishment could be made racially palatable by
changing its “for whites only” character and guaranteeing black families
murderer-execution benefits in highly aggravated cases.108 Conversely,
Justice Powell regarded the McCleskey litigation as an unwarranted
“challenge to the validity of the [capital statutes] that repeatedly have been
approved by this Court and scores of other courts.”109 Powell found it difficult
“to think of many cases with aggravating circumstances worse than those in
this case.”110
Moreover, Powell was uncertain that even Stevens’s plan would survive
the McCleskey standard, noting that a “borderline area would continue to
exist” and that “the discrepancy between borderline cases would be difficult
to explain.”111 To be sure, race can influence the very interpretation of
aggravation and mitigation, from the malign tendency to view aggravators
like “heinousness” through a racial lens to a more benign acceptance of the
leniency sentiments of black victims’ families.112 As such, nondiscrimination
in capital punishment might require what law professor Randall Kennedy has
characterized as “affirmative action” for execution. He observed, “it is not
self-evident why—if race can and should be taken into account in redressing
racial injustice in employment, housing, voting, and education—race cannot
also be taken into account in reforming capital sentencing.”113
Suffice it to say, the notion of affirmative action for death did not
flourish in the Supreme Court. One may reason that the Court was swinging
toward rigid colorblindness, a sentiment reflected in 1997’s Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, which applied the “strict scrutiny” test formerly
reserved for invidious discrimination to race-conscious remedial programs
in employment.114 However, Justice Powell, who retired before Adarand,
108

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Powell Memo to Leslie, supra note 66, at 3–4.
110
Justice Powell’s Handwritten Oral Argument Notes (Oct. 15, 1986) (located in Justice Powell’s
McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law Library at 88),
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles
[https://perma.cc/8G5R-FK56].
111
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 318 n.45 (majority opinion).
112
For studies on African-Americans’ tendency toward mercy regarding capital punishment, see
Theodore Eisenberg, Death Sentence Rates and County Demographics: An Empirical Study, 90 CORNELL
L. REV. 347, 370 (2005) (empirical study suggesting that “minority community skepticism about the
justness of the death penalty” contributes to disparity); Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of
Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26, 46–47 (2000) (citing studies and concluding that “black
juror[s] [are] more likely to have found the defendant likable as a person” regardless of other
characteristics).
113
Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1438.
114
515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
109
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was not unalterably set against color-conscious reasoning. Powell had
authored the famous affirmative action case, Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, which struck down race-based quotas but approved
racial preferences in higher education.115 Instead, as Professor Kennedy’s
article notes, Powell’s anti-affirmative action sentiments appeared unique to
the capital punishment context, reflecting a squeamishness toward racially
distributing death. Thus, although Powell may not have been completely
sanguine about affirmative action in general, the McCleskey majority’s
reluctance to racially calibrate execution also reflected abolitionist
sentiments that death is, in fact, different.116
Professor Kennedy argues that abolitionist first principles largely
“determined the response of those outraged by racial patterns in capital
sentencing.”117 To an abolitionist, the idea of applying barbaric and
uncivilized capital punishment based on the racial makeup of a case is
particularly repugnant, even if to remedy systemic disparities. In 2010,
several prominent abolitionist lawyers and scholars authored a law review
article criticizing South Carolina’s racist capital punishment system.118 In it,
they discussed several cases that involved “direct evidence of racial
discrimination,” including a prosecutor’s outrageous reference to a black
defendant as “King-Kong.”119 The article recounts a “particularly
instructive” case in which a death penalty prosecutor admitted:
I felt like the black community would be upset though if we did not seek the
death penalty because there were two black victims in this case. . . . I felt like if
we did not seek the death penalty, that the community, the black community
would be upset because we are seeking the death penalty in the (Andre)
Rosemond case for the murder of two white people.120

The prosecutor’s reasoning, although imprecise and incomplete, seems
like the type of race-conscious distributional analysis that vindicates the
importance of black lives.121 Unsurprisingly, the state supreme court reversed
115
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion). An alumnus of Harvard Law School, Powell appended
to his opinion Harvard College’s admissions policy, which stated that “the race of an applicant may tip
the balance in his favor.” Id. at 316.
116
Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1393.
117
Id.
118
See John H. Blume et al., When Lightning Strikes Back: South Carolina’s Return to the
Unconstitutional, Standardless Capital Sentencing Regime of the Pre-Furman Era, 4 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 479, 515–16 (2010).
119
Id. at 514.
120
Id. at 515–16 (2010) (citation omitted).
121
See, e.g., Douglas O. Linder, Juror Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV. 887, 910 (1996)
(exhorting prosecutors to “understand the importance of reminding jurors . . . that the lives of black
victims are as valuable as lives of white victims” and suggesting that prosecutors “use closing arguments
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the case on equal protection grounds—a life-preserving result viewed
positively by the article’s abolitionist authors. However, the South Carolina
postconviction court did not reverse on abolitionist or even “death is
different” grounds, but strictly on an Adarand-like colorblindness theory:
[I]f the victims in this case had been white, and the deputy prosecutor had stated
that the white community would have been upset if the State had not sought
death, then clearly it would be an unconstitutional race-based decision to seek
death, and a new trial would have been required. It is no different when the
deputy prosecutor states that the concerns of the black community were
discussed and considered in the State’s decision to seek death.122

Professor Kennedy’s analysis that abolitionist sentiments are woven
into the very fabric of the race and death penalty discussion reveals that the
racial disparity argument was born in interest convergence. Had McCleskey
prevailed, it would have been by means of a merger of antidiscrimination
ideals and larger “institutional” critiques of capital punishment, both racebased (the institution is inherently racist) and nonracial (the institution is
philosophically immoral). Surely, Justice Brennan would have signed on to
a death penalty moratorium based on the system’s “devaluation” of black
victims, even though Brennan would regard as anathema Professor
Kennedy’s characterization of capital punishment as “a useful and highly
valued public good” to be distributed equally.123 Brennan’s dissent
assiduously avoids characterizing leniency as a harm to black victims,
concentrating instead on the mutually constitutive history of slavery, racial
oppression, and state-sponsored execution that renders the punishment
inherently racist, even if meted out equitably.124 This stands in stark contrast
to liberal scholars who critique capital punishment for denying black
victims’ families “the sense of closure and ‘justice’ that the death penalty
affords.”125
to tell the stories of black victims in such a way as to emphasize points of commonality with white
jurors”).
122
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigating for Racial Fairness After McCleskey v. Kemp, 39 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 178, 179–80 (2007) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
123
Kennedy, apparently without irony, compares execution to electricity: “abolition as a remedy for
race-of-the-victim disparities is equivalent to reducing to darkness a town in which street lights have been
provided on a racially unequal basis.” Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1440.
124
See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 328–31 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.,
Black Man’s Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 33 (2002) (arguing that
Kennedy’s analysis relies on the “fallacy” that the remedy to racial discrimination is “executing more
people” and asserting that “[w]e could approach the problem instead by ceasing to over-value white life
so much—that is, we could decrease the rate at which we execute black killers of whites such that it
matches the rate at which we execute black killers of blacks” (emphasis omitted)).
125
Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying Prosecutorial
Discrimination Against Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 145 (1998); see also
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Professor Kennedy himself acknowledged the dangers of racially
distributing death. In addition to the potential that it “might actually lead to
the execution of more black defendants,”126 there is the danger “that raceconscious reform would simply degenerate into an expedient tokenism
designed to save capital punishment[,] . . . that defendants might be
sentenced to death primarily to create ‘good’ statistics.”127 The Justices
clearly harbored an aversion to racially “tinker[ing] with the machinery of
death.”128 Justices Marshall and O’Connor asked Boger how discrimination
against victims constitutes discrimination against defendants. He answered:
[I]f I have two defendants at my right hand, and two at my left, and the two at
my right have murdered whites in Georgia, and two at my left have murdered
blacks, surely my defendants on the right hand would have standing if Georgia
had a statute that made killing a white person a [more] serious crime.129

O’Connor responded, “It’s such a curious case, because what’s the
remedy? Is it to execute more people?”130
C. The Leniency Fear
The majority opinion itself indicates less a concern that reformed
capital systems would involve affirmative action than trepidation that
McCleskey’s success would prevent capital punishment (and other serious
sentences) from surviving in any form. This fear appears as Justice Powell’s
can-of-worms argument: “McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical
conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our
entire criminal justice system. The Eighth Amendment is not limited in
application to capital punishment, but applies to all penalties.”131 Throughout
the process of preparing the majority opinion, Powell made clear his belief
that the “petitioner’s challenge is no less than to our entire criminal justice
system.”132
Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 473
(1998) (failure to impose death causes “emotional harm” to “the family and friends of the undervalued
black victim”).
126
Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1392.
127
Id. at 1439.
128
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129
Oral Argument at 14:32, supra note 100.
130
Id.
131
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314–15.
132
Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Leslie &
Ronald 6 (Nov. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Powell Memo to Leslie & Ronald] (located in Justice Powell’s
McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law Library at 116–
124),
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles
[https://perma.cc/8G5R-FK56]; see also Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice,
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Justice Brennan critiqued Powell’s fear of “open[ing] the door to
widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing,” stating, “Taken
on its face, such a statement seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.”133
Brennan further argued that any disproportionate death sentencing, even of
those with “blond hair,” “would be repugnant to deeply rooted conceptions
of fairness.”134 To Justice Powell, however, Brennan’s argument was little
more than an admission of “the scope of his dissent,” namely, “a system of
‘statistical jurisprudence’ unprecedented in civilized history.”135 Brennan
unquestionably viewed the Court’s role as a bulwark against governmental
overreach:
[T]he methods we employ in the enforcement of our criminal law have aptly
been called the measures by which the quality of our civilization may be judged.
Those whom we would banish from society or from the human community itself
often speak in too faint a voice to be heard above society’s demand for
punishment. It is the particular role of courts to hear these voices, for the
Constitution declares that the majoritarian chorus may not alone dictate the
conditions of social life.136

Given Brennan’s impassioned plea, it is somewhat surprising his
dissent goes on to accommodate Powell’s fear by suggesting that the Court
could limit McCleskey’s impact to “qualitatively different” death penalty
cases.137 To be sure, a holding favorable to McCleskey could have specified
that only death sentences merited heightened equal protection review.
However, such a result would, again, be unsatisfactory to Justice Powell,
who was convinced of the continued propriety, if not desirability, of capital
punishment.138 The Baldus study may have moved Justice Blackmun, who
Supreme Court of the U.S., to Leslie 3 (Oct. 14, 1986) (located in Justice Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp
Case File on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law Library at 78–80),
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles
[https://perma.cc/8G5R-FK56]) (underlining the statement, “[b]ecause of the limitless application of a
challenge like that posed by McCleskey,” and writing, “Yes” in the margin).
133
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134
Id.
135
Justice Powell’s Handwritten Notes on First Draft of Justice Brennan’s Dissent 19 (circulated
Jan. 30 1987) [hereinafter Powell’s Notes on Brennan’s Dissent] (located in Justice Powell’s McCleskey
v. Kemp Case File on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law Library at 270–94),
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles
[https://perma.cc/8G5R-FK56]) (writing in the margin of the first draft of Brennan’s dissent, in response
to the “fear of too much justice” passage).
136
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 343 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted); see also id. at 365 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“If a grant of relief to him were to lead to a closer
examination of the effects of racial considerations throughout the criminal justice system, the system, and
hence society, might benefit.”).
137
Id. at 339–42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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had long “abhorred” the death penalty, to switch sides, but Powell’s
commitment to the punishment remained steadfast.139 Powell regarded
execution as the presumptively rational, intuitive, and warranted punishment
for murderers like Warren McCleskey, of whom he stated, “[i]ndeed, on the
facts of this case, it is unlikely that any jury—in a state where capital
punishment is authorized—could have given him any other sentence.”140
This presumption in favor of capital punishment for murder explains
why Powell’s opinion equates discretion with leniency, despite that
McCleskey was not about mandating execution or limiting mitigating factors,
but abolition.141 Compared to mandatory capital punishment, preserving
sentencing discretion is lenient, but compared to abolition, preserving the
discretion to impose death is severe. Powell’s myopic view of discretion
stemmed from his innate sense that the prosecutor’s and jury’s natural
inclination is to impose death for aggravated murder. When for racial or
other reasons they do not, it is an act of mercy that defendants should
appreciate. 142 Powell adhered to this view, despite the Baldus study showing
an inverse phenomenon of racialized “excessiveness.”143 Prosecutors and
jurors generally refrained from imposing death in mid-level cases like
McCleskey’s and did so only when white victimhood impelled them to be
uncharacteristically severe.144 Indeed, “among those 17 defendants who had
been charged with homicides of Fulton County police officers between 1973
and 1980, only one defendant other than [McCleskey] had even received a
penalty trial. In that case, where the victim was black, a life sentence was
imposed.”145

139

See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Leslie 4
(Nov. 1, 1986) (located in Justice Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with Washington & Lee
University School of Law Library at 125–31), http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles [https://perma.cc/8G5R-FK56]).
141
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 311 (majority opinion) (“Discretion in the criminal justice system offers
substantial benefits to the criminal defendant.”).
142
See id.
143
Baldus et al., supra note 3, at 698.
144
Id.
145
Brief for Petitioner at 16, McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (No. 84-6811), 1986 WL 727359, at
*16. In 1994, a retired Justice Powell confessed to his biographer John Jeffries that McCleskey was the
one decision he regretted and he had come to embrace abolition. JEFFRIES, supra note 68, at 442.
However, Powell’s change of heart appears less an eleventh-hour realization of the racist nature of capital
punishment than a conclusion that recent litigation had rendered the punishment too random and
infrequent to serve any penological purpose. According to Jeffries, the Justice had received a “bitter
education” from reviewing capital cases, with their corresponding “endless waiting, merry-go-round
litigation, last-minute stays, and midnight executions [that] offended Powell’s sense of dignity and his
conception of the majesty of the law.” Id. at 452.
140

1360

112:1337 (2018)

Equal Protection Under the Carceral State

Powell also found Brennan’s “death is different” argument
unpersuasive because he simply did not believe McCleskey’s disparity claim
could be so confined. Reacting to Brennan’s eloquent draft dissent, Powell
remarked, “Great jury speech, but no answer other than to abolish capital
punishment, and this would leave much of [Brennan’s] argument applicable
to felony sentences generally—for example life sentences for murder and
rape.”146 In the McCleskey opinion, Powell points to Solem v. Helm—a
holding he authored declaring a petty offender’s mandatory life sentence
under a three-strikes regime unconstitutionally disproportionate in violation
of the Eighth Amendment—as opening the door to McCleskey-style
arbitrariness claims in noncapital cases.147 Those familiar with the Court’s
subsequent noncapital proportionality jurisprudence might find this idea
somewhat laughable, given how impotent the Court has rendered the Eighth
Amendment in checking outrageous carceral sentences. However, these
confines of the Eighth Amendment may not have been evident to Powell at
the time, as a memo to his law clerks confirms: “If McCleskey were to
prevail, not only would other minorities seek to avoid capital punishment on
the basis of statistics; blacks and other minorities would attempt to extend
McCleskey to rape, life sentences, and possibly other crimes and penalties,
relying on the Eighth Amendment.”148
Indeed, Powell was on to something in predicting a jurisprudence-ofdeath creep. The last decade has seen an unprecedented application of Eighth
Amendment principles in nondeath cases. After the 2005 Roper v. Simmons
case, which ruled capital punishment cruel and unusual as applied to
minors,149 the Court applied the case’s principles outside of the capital
context, banning life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for minors
who had committed nonmurder crimes in 2010,150 prohibiting mandatory
LWOP for any minor in 2012,151 and declaring the ban retroactive in 2016.152
Simmons undoubtedly brought about a significant transformation in
noncapital juvenile sentencing. Had the McCleskey Court adopted an
antidiscrimination rule for capital punishment, it would only have been a

146

Powell’s Notes on Brennan’s Dissent, supra note 135, at 25.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)).
148
Powell Memo to Leslie & Ronald, supra note 132, at 7.
149
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
150
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
151
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
152
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). This line of cases has raised hope in two
directions. First, that proportionality might yet have its moment in the sun, and second, that the Eighth
Amendment will put limits on juvenile sentences more generally. The Court has since changed, and may
change again, foreclosing either avenue.
147
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short matter of time before defendants began challenging their racially
discriminatory LWOP sentences.153
Finally, Powell feared not just the potential for disparity challenges to
flood the courts, but that judicial recognition of bias in the administration of
criminal justice would undermine the presumption of legitimacy that
maintained the state criminal apparatus. Although not quite as obvious in
McCleskey, this fear was front and center in Powell’s Furman dissent. In
Furman, Justice Powell wrote specifically to respond to Brennan’s and
Marshall’s concurrences. Marshall’s concurrence famously invokes the
notion of a reasonably informed citizenry, stating that “a violation of the
Eighth Amendment is totally dependent on the predictable subjective,
emotional reactions of informed citizens.”154 Marshall concluded that armed
with all the information about capital punishment, including its disparate
application to the disempowered, “the average citizen would, in my opinion,
find it shocking to his conscience and sense of justice.”155 Powell’s response
to this contention displays far more alacrity than does the entirety of his
McCleskey opinion:
Certainly the claim is justified that this criminal sanction falls more heavily on
the relatively impoverished and underprivileged elements of society. The
“have-nots” in every society always have been subject to greater pressure to
commit crimes and to fewer constraints than their more affluent fellow citizens.
This is, indeed, a tragic byproduct of social and economic deprivation, but it is
not an argument of constitutional proportions under the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment. . . . The root causes of the higher incidence of criminal penalties
on “minorities and the poor” will not be cured by abolishing the system of
penalties. Nor, indeed, could any society have a viable system of criminal
justice if sanctions were abolished or ameliorated because most of those who
commit crimes happen to be underprivileged. The basic problem results not
from the penalties imposed for criminal conduct but from social and economic
factors that have plagued humanity since the beginning of recorded
history . . . .156

While not as extreme as Scalia’s belief that bias is “ineradicable” and
unproblematic, Powell firmly rejected that criminal authority could be
sacrificed in the quest to ameliorate social inequalities, “tragic” though they
were. Powell’s certainty that remedying disparity threatened the continued
survival of state punishment led him to pursue some surreal argumentative
153

See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 n.38 (1987) (citing studies demonstrating a racial
disparity in length of criminal sentences).
154
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 362 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
155
Id. at 369.
156
Id. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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strategies. Powell considered devoting a portion of the majority opinion to
describing ubiquitous discrimination against many types of minorities to
make the point that crime commission (and therefore punishment) is
inevitably disparate. He wrote to his clerks,
The history of blacks’ mistreatment in the deep South will be emphasized by
the dissents. But apart from slavery (abolished a century and a third ago), racial
prejudice has existed, and may still exist, against Orientals in parts of the West
Coast. . . . [and] Chicanos, Spanish Americans and Indians also may claim
discrimination.157

By the time this contention appeared in a footnote in the final opinion, it was
less a catalogue of entrenched inequality than a caution that the socialconstructivist nature of race and ethnicity allowed any given defendant to
claim minority status and thus discrimination. Nevertheless, Powell initially
endorsed the remarkable argument that widespread historical and current
racial discrimination, which caused social dysfunction among minorities,
was a ground to reject McCleskey’s equal protection challenge.
Throughout the McCleskey proceedings, Powell adhered to his faith that
endemic inequality is “unrelated” to the operation of positive criminal law,
such that regardless of social circumstances, individual defendants are fully
culpable.158 His insistence on “case-by-case” analysis sought to protect the
fragile illusion that criminal law punishes internally bad individuals.159
Marshall’s “reasonably informed citizenry” standard, like the “rotten social
background” defense or philosophical objections to the operation of
“constitutive” luck in criminal law, stabbed at the heart of the shared
presumption, or self-induced delusion, that there is true criminality untainted
by the stain of inequality.160 Powell imagined that the criminal justice house-

157

Powell Memo to Leslie & Ronald, supra note 132, at 6; cf. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315–17 &
n.39 (noting the fluidity of race, listing multiple types of minority identities, and asserting that Whites
can even claim minority status to support the caution that McCleskey’s “claim that his sentence rests on
the irrelevant factor of race easily could be extended to apply to claims based on unexplained
discrepancies that correlate to membership in other minority groups”).
158
Furman, 408 U.S. at 447–48 (Powell, J., dissenting).
159
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
160
This objection arises in the debate over “moral luck,” that is, whether attributions of immorality
or personal responsibility can be based on luck factors. The constitutive luck objection asserts that
because individuals’ endemic and environmental conditions characters are a matter of chance, punishing
them for criminal choices assesses culpability based on luck factors. See Jamal Greene, Beyond
Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.J. 1862, 1909 (2006); Gruber, Distributive Theory,
infra note 218, at 28–29; Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 35 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993).
McCleskey played out not during the post-World War II era of rehabilitation and treatment, but at the
height of Reagan’s retributivist war on crime and drugs.
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of-cards could easily fold under the pressure of Marshall’s structural
objection, presaging a massive overhaul of the machinery of incarceration.161
But this fear was proved unwarranted. In recent years, as evidence has
amassed of the inherently racially biased nature of criminal punishment,
even the most liberal lawmakers have found themselves in a state of
perpetual cognitive dissonance, with Justice Marshall on one shoulder and
Justice Powell on the other. Like Marshall, they recognize that criminal
prosecution and punishment is about far more than individual culpability—
it is about power, race, socioeconomic status, and other inequalities. At the
same time, like Powell, they struggle with how or whether this structural
objection should affect the prosecution and punishment of guilty individual
offenders, particularly violent criminals and rapists.162
III. EQUALITY VERSUS JUSTICE IN THE CARCERAL STATE
The above analysis characterizes McCleskey as a case concerned more
with preserving penal authority than foreclosing equal protection analysis.
However, it in no way dislodges McCleskey from its rightful place of infamy
alongside Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu.163 Justice Powell’s veneration
of capital punishment in the face of its brutally racist past—not to mention
his willingness to use ubiquitous discrimination as an argument against equal
protection relief—demonstrates his ignorance of the racial significance of
the penalty within American history, especially Southern history. Moreover,
Powell’s belief that the administration of criminal punishment must be
totally siloed from arguments about endemic inequalities is the very ideology
that rendered criminal law the preferred response to social problems,
including race- and gender-based violence, even as the system morphed into
the primary site of racial injustice, imprisoning more black men than the
number in bondage under slavery.164
Powell’s tolerance of racial discrimination was thus institutionally
determined. He accepted disparity claims about institutions like voting and
housing, but such claims were unacceptable when they challenged capital
punishment. Unlike Scalia, who contested the Court’s role in remedying any
161

See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
See James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21 (2012).
163
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before and After
McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 47 (2007); Scott E. Sundby, The Loss of Constitutional
Faith: McCleskey v. Kemp and the Dark Side of Procedure, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 5, 5 (2012).
164
Max Ehrenfreund, There’s a Disturbing Truth to John Legend’s Oscar Statement About Prisons
and Slavery, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/23/
theres-a-disturbing-truth-to-john-legends-oscar-statement-about-prisons-and-slavery
[https://perma.cc/MA44-GF3A].
162
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institutional racial disparities, Powell’s overarching interest was preserving
the death penalty, and he was willing to turn a blind eye to the fact that this
institution was born in and infused with discrimination. Justice Powell’s
unconditional embrace of the death penalty is racially fraught, but in a
different manner than Scalia’s tolerance of “ineradicable” racism.165 One
might analogize the difference between Scalia’s and Powell’s views to the
difference between fast and slow violence. Fast violence occurs when racist
police officers kill unarmed black civilians, and slow violence occurs when
the cumulative conditions of racialized inequality and disenfranchisement
leave an island vulnerable to a hurricane.166 Similarly, fast racism is tiki-torch
bearing white supremacists,167 and slow racism is “the white moderate, who
is more devoted to ‘order’ than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which
is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of
justice.”168 I hesitate to use “racist” to describe either Scalia’s or Powell’s
views and recognize a distinction between white-supremacists and equal
protection-averse jurists, so I will term Powell’s law-and-order concerns
“slow racialist” and Scalia’s anti-antidiscrimination stance “fast racialist.”
I emphasize Powell’s slow-racialist sentiments as an admonition to race
scholars that lawmakers and state actors’ acceptance or rejection of racial
disparity evidence is a function of more than just fast-racialist denial of all
antidiscrimination claims. Powell would have been more sanguine about
McCleskey’s anti-discrimination interests if they converged with his slowracialist interest in sustaining capital punishment. This Part accordingly
sounds a caution that victim-based disparity claims, that is, arguments and
evidence that the criminal system treats those who offend against minority
victims with undue leniency, often converge with larger interests in
bolstering the American penal state. A poignant example is domestic
violence reform, where feminists’ interest in fair treatment of female victims
converged with prosecutors’ interest in punishing batterers, resulting in
punitive policies that actually devalued and materially harmed women.
165

Justice Scalia, in fact, believed there should not be limits on “relevant aggravating evidence” in
capital sentencing. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 833 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
166
See generally ROB NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR (2011)
(discussing the causes and implications of slow violence). See also Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense,
103 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 326–30 (2015) (commenting on fast and slow violence); Levi Gahman &
Gabrielle Thongs, In the Caribbean, Colonialism and Inequality Mean Hurricanes Hit Harder, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Sept. 24, 2017, 10:45 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/caribbean-colonialisminequality-mean-hurricanes-hit-harder [https://perma.cc/ZSN2-Y6UB] (explaining why poverty and
social inequality increased the devastation of the Caribbean hurricanes).
167
See Matt Stevens, White Nationalists Reappear in Charlottesville in Torch-Lit Protest, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/08/us/richard-spencer-charlottesville.html
[https://perma.cc/W7NU-FWVT].
168
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 85, 96 (1963).
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Lawmakers’ and other state actors’ receptivity to disparity claims vary by
their interests, and the criminal arena is one in which punitive interests are
ascendant. To the extent that the American penal state is constitutively racist,
formal equality efforts to treat minority victims fairly by leveling up
punishment can end up undermining larger substantive racial equality in
society.
A. When Antidiscrimination and Pro-Punishment Interests Converge
Interest convergence theory predicts that even the fast-racialist, antiequal-protection camp will occasionally accept racial disparity evidence
when in the service of preserving some other value. Recall that abolitionist
lawyers deployed the Baldus study within the context of a death-penalty
jurisprudence in which mandatory execution was off the table. In this setting,
they could predict that the Court’s acceptance of McCleskey’s claims would
result in a death penalty moratorium, possibly indefinitely, or, in the worst
case, preservation of the institution with a substantial narrowing of death
eligibility, a la Stevens. LDF lawyers would have faced a much trickier
strategic choice had mandatory execution remained viable. If the abolitionist
lawyers thought that the Court would accept their equal protection claims but
remedy them through mandating or even re-distributing death, they may
have simply refrained from pursuing disparity arguments. To be sure, in
cases like Graham v. Collins, conservative Justices trot out the racial
disparity claim to justify limits on mitigating evidence and, in turn, increase
the probability of death sentences.169
Now, a person such as Professor Kennedy, who is preoccupied with
formal equality between white and black victims in capital cases and harbors
no preference between level-up and level-down remedies, might balk at such
LDF restraint. To some, eliminating whatever individual disparity they
encounter through whatever means is an end in itself—and the end of the
story. However, many racial justice scholars acknowledge that a given
disparity is just one among multiple hierarchies that operate within the
criminal system’s complex matrix of power. Justices Marshall and Brennan
knew that securing fleeting equality gains through racially balancing the
distribution of death came at the cost of preserving a historically and
symbolically racist institution that imbues blackness with criminality.
Importantly, racial justice scholars who criticize noncapital sentencing
disparities should bear in mind that there is largely no upper limit on
imprisonment—mandatory penalties are permissible, and legislators can
easily create new crimes. Right-wing lawmakers, for example, routinely
169
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justified three-strikes and mandatory-minimum laws on the ground that they
treat all eligible offenders equally.170 If such fast-racialist actors occasionally
“switch sides,” moderates with law-and-order sensibilities will positively
line up to support disparity claims that coincide with increased prosecution.
Mass incarceration is not just the product of racists who relish AfricanAmerican imprisonment, pearl-clutching city dwellers feeling besieged, or
even those with a colorblind faith that “all lives matter.”171 Equality-minded
moderates and liberals have fully participated in the penal experiment of latemodern America. They too harbor a “punitive impulse” stemming “from a
sustained national eidos that has for decades accepted criminal law as a
legitimate, if not the preferred, response to harms.”172 Like Justice Powell,
even progressives draw a bright line between their philosophical aversion to
“tragic” social inequality and their “embrace [of] punitivity for whatever
they consider true harm.”173
Examples of interest convergence in the criminal law arena, where
lawmakers remedy disparities by leveling up criminal punishment, are
legion. From federal sentencing guidelines to mandatory domestic violence
prosecutions, powerful state actors advance equality claims as part of a web
of “fairness” rationales for tough punishment. Indeed, activists and
lawmakers often frame victim-based discrepancies in the distribution of
punishment as unfair leniency,174 a la Justice Powell, instead of unusual
severity brought on by preferred victimhood, as the Baldus study actually
demonstrated.175 The leniency framing itself suggests a level-up solution,
which is an ever-present possibility in noncapital sentencing. In the 1980s,
conservatives and liberals came together to decry the arbitrariness of and
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See, e.g., The Repeat Criminal Offender/Three Strikes Fair Sentencing Act of 2006, at 1 (filed
Jan.
20,
2006),
http://caag.state.ca.us/initiatives/pdf/sa2006rf0005_amdt_1_s.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YF29-QYND] (providing “a complete, proportionate or consistent statutory structure
for appropriately and fairly sentencing repeat offenders” in California).
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Ian Olasov, How Did “All Lives Matter” Come to Oppose “Black Lives Matter”? A Philosopher
of Language Weighs In., SLATE: LEXICON VALLEY (July 18, 2016, 11:11 AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/lexicon_valley/2016/07/18/all_lives_matter_versus_black_lives_matter_ho
w_does_the_philosophy_of_language.html [https://perma.cc/2HBJ-PXDR].
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Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical Criminal Law
Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211, 3223 (2015) [hereinafter Gruber, When Theory Met Practice].
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Id.
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See Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 129, 143–55 (2014)
(discussing activists’ common framing of the provocation doctrine as discriminatory leniency toward
those men who offend against women and their calls for abolishing or narrowing the defense, and citing
cases and articles).
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See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text.
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disparities in criminal sentencing,176 and receptive lawmakers quickly settled
on rigid, mandatory federal sentencing guidelines.177 Not surprisingly, the
regime was a “one-way upward ratchet” of harsh sentences, exposing
lawmakers’ imaginaire that the prototypical defendant in any given crime is
always the most reprehensible, clearly guilty version of a thief, robber, killer,
etc.178 Moreover, through its codification of “common sense,” or politically
expedient, notions of which crimes are “worse”—for example dealing crack
is worse than dealing cocaine—the guidelines created greater racial
disparity.179
B. Feminism, Gender Disparity Claims, and Police Power
It is in the space where feminism meets criminal law that we see
antidiscrimination and prosecutorial interests converge most profoundly.
During the juris-generative “second wave” of feminism, roughly the 1970s
through 1990s, feminists embarked on a reformist campaign to raise
awareness of the unfair leniency afforded to men who offend against
women.180 This campaign proceeded parallel to other second-wave feminist
agitation on workplace discrimination, reproductive rights, and wage
equality. However, feminist efforts for noncriminal law reform encountered
difficulty in translating proposals into positive law, were besieged by
opposition, and riddled with setbacks.181 Women are literally “pregnant with
176

See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENTS IN AMERICA 164
(1995); Honorable Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV.
569, 573 (2005).
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See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1944 (1988) (noting the “general consensus . . . among judges,
lawyers, criminal justice experts, and scholars that sentencing guidelines were needed”); see also Stephen
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest,
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Frank O. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal
Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 246 (2005).
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See id. at 256. In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Supreme Court struck down
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unsupported by the evidence).
180
See Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and Status in Family Law,
85 IND. L.J. 893, 950 (2010) (describing the “second wave” of feminism as “stretching from the 1960s
until the 1990s”).
181
See generally Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of AntiDiscrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2012) (describing onerous hurdles confronted by
discrimination plaintiffs).
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discrimination,” and yet attacks on women’s reproductive freedom and
health persist with vigor.182 A democratically aligned government under
President Barack Obama could do no more than produce feckless legislation
on wage equality.183 The idea of the state imposing mandatory pay equality
or gender-based quotas (or any identity-based quotas) on private businesses,
as under some European laws, feels utterly un-American.184
Feminist reformers’ efforts to cabin the discretion of powerful male
actors met an altogether different fate in the criminal law realm. Reformers
advanced a straightforward discriminatory leniency contention, which was
not necessarily historically accurate,185 that police, prosecutors, judges, and
jurors had a longstanding practice of tolerating violence against women—
regarding it as a private matter, an insoluble problem not worthy of
government intervention, or worse, legitimate chastisement.186 This
182
See Michele Goodwin & Meigan Thompson, In the Shadow of the Court: Strategic Federalism
and Reproductive Rights, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 333, 335 (2017) (“Copiously documented evidence
details the harsh impacts produced by laws targeting women’s reproductive healthcare rights, including
serious hurdles to access abortion rights, criminalizing certain conduct during pregnancy, and even
restricting pregnant women’s medical autonomy at the end of life. Lawmakers refer to the latter as
‘pregnancy exclusion laws,’ because that type of legislation functions to literally exclude pregnant women
from autonomous decision-making at the end of life.”).
183
See Martha Chamallas, Ledbetter, Gender Equity and Institutional Context, 70 OHIO ST. L.J.
1037, 1049 (2009) (describing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act as “a very modest piece of legislation and
will not alone bring pay equity back from the dead”).
184
See Véronique Magnier & Darren Rosenblum, Quotas and the Transatlantic Divergence of
Corporate Governance, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 249 (2014) (contrasting European gender-based quotas
with American shareholder primacy). Today, even uber-liberal Silicon Valley companies cannot bring
themselves to mandate representational and pay equality, touting the need for discretion to hire and
promote “tech stars.” See Ellen Huet, Inside Silicon Valley’s Struggles to Hire More Women and
Minorities, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/diversity-inclusion/blog/insidesilicon-valleys-struggles-hire-women-minorities [https://perma.cc/RE6H-7PWC].
185
Legal historian Carolyn B. Ramsey, engaged in a review of domestic violence law and policy in
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries and discovered:

Police responded to calls for help, and courts routinely forced violent men to pay fines or spend
time in jail for wife beating. Legal materials and newspaper reports on such cases reveal
widespread condemnation of male violence against women and the repudiation of husbands’
claims to a right to use corporal punishment on disobedient wives. The failure of state efforts to
prevent recidivism and the escalation of intimate-partner violence was likely attributable to the
general disorganization of early police departments and the reluctance of abused women to
prosecute their husbands, rather than to widespread misogyny.
Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Exit Myth: Family Law, Gender Roles, and Changing Attitudes Toward Female
Victims of Domestic Violence, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 7 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
186
For articles on second-wave feminist domestic violence activism and legal reforms, see BETH E.
RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA’S PRISON NATION (2012);
Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color,
33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009 (2000); Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist
Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2009)
[hereinafter Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism]; Leigh Goodmark, Should Domestic Violence Be
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argument about unfair leniency toward woman-abusers converged with other
phenomena, including intensified criminal law governance, the powerful
victims’ rights movement, and conservative lawmakers’ concern that
disordered homes represented a threat to “family values.”187 In the mid1980s, the issue of domestic violence reached a new pinnacle in public
discussion and popular consciousness. President Reagan’s Surgeon General
C. Everett Koop declared domestic violence a public health emergency,
testifying in front of the Senate that a quarter of American women, “that’s
15 million women,” experience domestic violence.188
The Surgeon General did not himself endorse an aggressive program of
criminalization, and the report appended to his testimony reads like a
progressive wish list.189 The number one recommendation for reducing
assaults and homicides was “a complete and universal federal ban on the
sale, manufacture, importation, and possession of handguns,” and others
included “full employment,” “an aggressive policy to reduce racial
discrimination and sexism,” and, pertinently, “abolishing capital punishment
by the state because all are models and sanctions of violence.”190 As for
domestic violence, the report endorsed programs to address “[r]elationships
between power, control, gender stereotypes, sex roles and violence; [and]
[n]onviolent resolution of interpersonal conflicts.”191 Suffice it to say, the
Reagan Administration did not adopt these socialistic strategies, pursuing
instead its preferred carceral strategy, with Koop’s statics serving to
galvanize the public against lax responses to wife abuse.
By the time of Koop’s testimony, President Reagan had already
commissioned a domestic violence task force helmed by prominent

Decriminalized?, 40 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 53 (2017) [hereinafter Goodmark, Should DV Be
Decriminalized?]; Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a Prison
Nation, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 38 (2011); Claire Houston, How Feminist Theory Became
(Criminal) Law: Tracing the Path to Mandatory Criminal Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases,
21 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217, 240, 253 (2014); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J.
2 (2006); Deborah M. Weissman, Law, Social Movements, and the Political Economy of Domestic
Violence, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 221, 223–24 (2013).
187
MARIE GOTTSHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION
IN AMERICA ch. 4 (2006); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741 (2007)
[hereinafter Gruber, Feminist War]; Suk, supra note 186.
188
Domestic Violence and Public Health: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs
and Alcoholism of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong. 2 (1985) (statement of
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/102525NCJRS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NR49-3GJT].
189
Id. at 5–48.
190
Id. at 7.
191
Id. at 41.
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conservatives.192 The task force was then-Missouri Attorney General John
Ashcroft’s entrée into federal governing. The resulting 1984 report of the
task force, unlike the Surgeon General’s report, called for a decontextualized law and order approach to family violence: “The legal
response to family violence must be guided primarily by the nature of the
abusive act, not the relationship between the victim and the abuser.”193 The
get-tough approach stemmed not from a concern for women’s equality and
independence, but from a desire to “strengthen family values.”194 Later, U.S.
Attorney General Ashcroft explained that reform had been necessary to
“transform” masochistic victims into good mothers.195 Ashcroft recalled a
conversation with a former victim: “She said, quote, ‘I finally realized the
truth, that I was hurting not only myself, but I was hurting my children even
more. I was teaching them by example that they deserved to be abused and
that violence was acceptable.’”196
Also in 1984, sociologist Lawrence Sherman and coauthor Richard
Berk published the famous “Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment,”
finding that arresting men for misdemeanor domestic violence produced a
greater deterrent effect than a mere warning or temporary separation.197
Sherman had collected and analyzed domestic violence arrest data in
Minneapolis and Milwaukee, from which he produced several published
studies in the 1980s and 1990s.198 The Minneapolis study was his first and
192
WILLIAM L. HART ET AL., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE: FINAL
REPORT (Sept. 1984) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
193
Id. at 4.
194
Id. at 119.
195
Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks at the Annual Symposium on Domestic
Violence
(October
29,
2002),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ovw/docs/agremarks.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q3W2-ED7V].
196
Id.
197
Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment,
POLICE FOUND. REP. (Apr. 1984), https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/the-minneapolisdomestic-violence-experiment [https://perma.cc/567R-FZB6].
198
See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS
(1992); Richard A. Berk & Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Responses to Family Violence Incidents: An
Analysis of an Experimental Design with Incomplete Randomization, 83 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 70 (1988);
Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter Domestic Violence?, 36 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 601 (1993); Lawrence W. Sherman & Douglas A. Smith, Crime, Punishment, and Stake in
Conformity: Legal and Informal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 680 (1992); Lawrence
W. Sherman et al., From Initial Deterrence to Long-Term Escalation: Short-Custody Arrest for Poverty
Ghetto Domestic Violence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 821 (1991); Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of
Criminology on Criminal Law: Evaluating Arrests for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 23–24 (1992); Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent
Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The
Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1992).
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least comprehensive study, examining recidivism in a six-month time frame,
but its pro-arrest conclusion proved to have an outsized influence. Professor
Stephen Schulhofer notes, “[b]y 1989, only five years after the study results
were released, 84% of urban police agencies reported having mandatory or
preferred arrest policies for domestic violence cases.”199 He further observes
that “the rapid and uncritical acceptance of the Minneapolis findings was
premature” and later and better studies demonstrated that, over time, “arrest
often seems to have an ‘escalation effect,’ aggravating the subsequent
violence.”200
In response to criticism that he had publicized the powerful study before
replication,201 Dr. Sherman authored a 1989 paper asking, “When should
researchers refrain from publicizing results and thus possibly influencing
legal policy?”202 The article concludes that researchers bear no responsibility
for policy changes but encourages policymakers to be better empiricists.203
The paper touts early publicity to “focus attention and funding on further
research,” reasoning that “[s]hould further studies reach different
conclusions, publicity about them can influence policies to change yet
again.”204 This evolutionary prediction proved naively optimistic, as even
Sherman’s own follow-up studies undermining the Minneapolis study and
his calls to abandon mandatory arrest did little to mitigate the study’s
influence.205 Today, lawmakers have little to no appetite for reversing their
hastily adopted pro-arrest policies.206
In 2015, Sherman and a colleague published yet another Minnesota
domestic violence study, this time a twenty-three-year follow-up of his 1988
Milwaukee study of 1,125 victims whose assaulters had been arrested or

199

Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2162

(1995).
200

Id. at 2162–63.
See generally Richard Lempert, Humility Is a Virtue: On the Publicization of Policy-Relevant
Research, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 145 (1989) (criticizing the publicization of the results of the
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experience as premature).
202
Lawrence W. Sherman & Ellen G. Cohn, The Impact of Research on Legal Policy: The
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117, 117 (1989).
203
Id. at 142.
204
Id.
205
See supra note 198 (citing studies).
206
See Jane K. Stoever, Parental Abduction and the State Intervention Paradox, 92 WASH. L. REV.
861, 868–69 (2017) (critiquing the aggressive policing and prosecution DV policies that began in the
1990s and persist today and noting that “[i]n recent decades, the state has largely taken a more protective
and often punitive posture”); see also Justine A. Dunlap, Soft Misogyny: The Subtle Perversion of
Domestic Violence “Reform”, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 775, 793–800 (2016) (cataloguing and critiquing
mandatory arrest and prosecution policies).
201
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warned.207 In reestablishing contact with study participants, Dr. Sherman was
surprised to find that many had passed away, but not from intimate partner
homicide. A full analysis of the data yielded astounding results: “Victims
were 64% more likely to have died of all causes if their partners were arrested
and jailed than if warned and allowed to remain at home. Among the 791
African-American victims, arrest increased mortality by 98%.”208 Further,
“murder of the victims caused only three of all 91 deaths; heart disease and
other internal morbidity caused most victim deaths.”209 Sherman
hypothesized, “There must be something about witnessing a partner’s arrest
that triggers a physiological response leading to higher rates of death . . . .”210
In racially and socioeconomically segregated Milwaukee, he reasoned, black
women did not have resources to cope with arrest-induced stress.211
Today, Sherman laments the mandatory policies his 1984 study
heralded: “Imagine if doctors were required by law to use surgery, and not
allowed to test chemotherapy as an alternative.”212 But for many lawmakers
and antiviolence activists, once the 1984 study confirmed that arrest is best,
the research–policy evolution simply ended. There is a sad irony in the End
Domestic Abuse Wisconsin organization’s summary dismissal of Sherman’s
2015 study: “Twenty-five-year-old data cannot be used to conclude that
domestic violence arrests are dangerous to victims.”213 The organization
confoundingly adds, “Thankfully for victims of domestic violence, we don’t
live in the 1980s anymore.”214
207

Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather M. Harris, Increased Death Rates of Domestic Violence
Victims from Arresting vs. Warning Suspects in the Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment (MilDVE),
11 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2015) https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11292014-9203-x.pdf [https://perma.cc/ETF5-LYF3].
208
Id. at 1.
209
Id.
210
Belinda Luscombe, When Not to Arrest an Abuser in a Domestic Violence Case, TIME MAG.
(Mar. 5, 2014), http://time.com/12682/when-not-to-arrest-an-abuser-in-a-domestic-violence-case
[https://perma.cc/H394-NTYN] (quoting Sherman).
211
Sherman & Harris, supra note 207, at 17–18. The 2015 Sherman study found that mandatory
arrest policies, intended to remedy a perceived gender disparity, may have created a more disturbing racial
one. Id. at 17. Indeed, the “face” of domestic violence in the 1980s and 90s was a white face—a young,
beautiful, blonde mother subject to horrific abuse and doubly victimized by state nonintervention. But
that face spurred tough prosecution initiatives that disproportionately affected poor communities of color.
See Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender
Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER L. 1, 37 (1998); Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 187, at 805; Cheryl I.
Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and Susan Smith—Spectacles of Our
Time, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 225 (1996).
212
Lawrence Sherman, University of Cambridge – Domestic Violence and Arrests, ACADEMIC
MINUTE (May 1, 2014, 12:44 PM), https://academicminute.org/2014/05/lawrence-sherman-universityof-cambridge-domestic-violence-and-arrests [https://perma.cc/2YJV-P2LT].
213
Luscombe, supra note 210.
214
Id.
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Outrage over the disparate leniency afforded to abusers became more
mainstream throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and by the millennium many
states had adopted not just pro-arrest policies, but also specialized courts, nodrop prosecution, and exceptional civil protection order procedures.215 In
2003, President George W. Bush, in synchronicity with feminist reformers,
praised level-up solutions to domestic violence leniency, telling domestic
violence prosecutors in his signature vernacular, “If you treat something as
a serious crime, then there must be serious consequences; otherwise it’s not
very serious.”216 Much like mandatory capital punishment would leave no
room for victims’ families with objections to execution, mandatory domestic
violence policies gave no quarter to victims who sought leniency for their
intimate partners. Prosecutors often ignored, or worse, mistreated victims
who resisted the prosecution and incarceration of their intimates.217
Elsewhere, conservatives argued that “victims’ rights” and victims’
presumptively punitive interests should trump prosecutorial discretion and
defendant protections,218 but in domestic violence, as the 1984 task force
insisted, “[t]he prosecutor and the judge, not the victim, determine whether
the case is prosecuted or dismissed.”219 Feminist reformers went along with
this program upon the belief that victims’ desires for leniency were

215
See generally Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 187, at 747. For arrest statistics, see Schulhofer,
supra note 199, Schmidt & Sherman, supra note 198, and SHERMAN, supra note 198. See also Goodmark,
Should DV Be Decriminalized?, supra note 186, at 62 n.36 (noting that “between 1997 and 2003, states
passed 700 new statutory provisions responding to domestic violence”). For protection order statistics,
see generally Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women:
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 811–1094 (1993) (surveying civil
protection order statutes in all fifty states, D.C., and Puerto Rico); Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection
Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention with Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 51,
53–56 (2000) (explaining the process of obtaining a civil protection order and discussing its effectiveness
in preventing domestic violence); Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence
Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285 (2000).
216
President George W. Bush, Remarks on Domestic Violence Prevention (Oct. 8, 2003),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2003-10-13/pdf/WCPD-2003-10-13-Pg1341.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W4XV-NFK7].
217
Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism, supra note 186, at 37–38. See generally Gruber, Feminist War,
supra note 187, at 773. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
POLICE
RESPONSE
TO
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE,
2006–2015,
at
1
(May
2017),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prdv0615.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P32-JJ32] (finding that victims
only signed complaints in about half (48%) of domestic violence incidents reported to police); see also
Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1302
(2016) (finding only 22% of African-American respondents said that they trusted courts).
218
MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME 167 (2002); Gruber, Feminist War,
supra note 187, at 757. Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1
(2010) [hereinafter Gruber, Distributive Theory].
219
FINAL REPORT, supra note 192, at 30.
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inauthentic products of “coercive control” that contributed to
underenforcement.220
Today, domestic violence systems routinely involve mandatory
policing and prosecution, special courts, compulsory protection orders,
immigration consequences, and de facto divorce.221 Beyond the trauma of
arrest and prosecution, victims also stand to lose a source of income, a coparenting asset, their public housing, the person they love, their own freedom
if arrested as a mutual aggressor, parental rights if the police observe neglect,
and presence in the United States if they are undocumented.222 With so much
to lose and no ability to hit pause on the prosecutorial machine, abused
women face a true dilemma in engaging the police or even medical
services.223 The class of domestic violence defendants, which increasingly
has included women, faces the costs of arrest, prosecution, incarceration, and
collateral consequences—including ineligibility for public housing,
government benefits, and employment.224 The domestic violence system
contributes significantly to a mass misdemeanor phenomenon that Professor
Alexandra Natapoff derisively describes as a revolving-door style of
prosecution that is indifferent to guilt or innocence and which devastates

220
See Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 187, at 815; Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering:
From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973 (1995).
221
For more information on these reform principles, see sources cited supra note 186. See also
Goodmark, Should DV Be Decriminalized?, supra note 186, at 83; Suk, supra note 186, at 7, 17–20;
Deborah M. Weissman, Countering Neoliberalism and Aligning Solidarities: Rethinking Domestic
Violence Advocacy, 45 SW. L. REV. 915, 922–34 (2016).
222
Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical
Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 804–05 (2001); Goodmark, Should DV Be Decriminalized?, supra
note 186, at 71–73; Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 187, at 804–06; Beth Richie, Battered Black
Women: A Challenge for the Black Community, 16 BLACK SCHOLAR 40, 40 (1985); see also Dee L. R.
Graham & P. Gail Allen, Victim Interviews and Surveys, in FACTORS RELATED TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
COURT DISPOSITIONS IN A LARGE URBAN AREA: THE ROLE OF VICTIM/WITNESS RELUCTANCE AND
OTHER VARIABLES, FINAL REPORT 114 (Joanne Belknap & Dee L. R. Graham eds., 2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/184232.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX5E-QVH6] (discussing
reasons for victim reluctance to prosecute, including fear of the legal system, love, desire to keep family
intact, and fear of reprisal).
223
See Meghan A. Novisky & Robert L. Peralta, When Women Tell: Intimate Partner Violence and
the Factors Related to Police Notification, 21 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 65 (2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25540249 [https://perma.cc/DQ8K-UEPD].
224
See Carol Bohmer et al., Domestic Violence Law Reforms: Reactions from the Trenches, 29 J.
SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 71, 78 (2002) (reporting on Ohio study that found a 142% rise in male arrests and
428% rise in female arrests); Goodmark, Should DV Be Decriminalized?, supra note 186, at 83–85;
Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 187, at 832; see also David Hirschel et al., Domestic Violence and
Mandatory Arrest Laws: To What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 255, 256, 259–61 (2007) (showing mandatory arrest statutes correlated with increased
dual arrest); cf. Dennis M. Cullinane et al., Offender-Victim Body Mass Ratio and the Decision to Arrest
in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 49 MED. SCI . & L. 200, 201 (2009).
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already-marginalized populations.225 An objective of mass misdemeanors, as
Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann discovered through meticulous
ethnographic research, is to mark individuals, scarlet-letter-style, to facilitate
the penal state’s management of large numbers at low cost.226
Indeed, domestic violence law reform has served to mark, but not
necessarily deter, abusers. In 2010, criminologists Joel Garner and
Christopher Maxwell released a meta-data analysis of the 135 Englishlanguage studies on domestic violence criminal law.227 They found that,
contrary to the “common wisdom” that prosecutions and convictions are
rare, the majority of domestic violence arrests (three-fifths) produced
prosecutions, and a third resulted in convictions.228 Of the thirty-two studies
involving quantitative analyses of criminal sanctions and repeat offending, a
preponderance reported that sanctions had no effect on or increased the risk
of offending.229 However, in light of problems with “the quality of the
research methods” of the studies, the authors performed a secondary analysis
of the available archived data, comprising 11,518 domestic violence cases.230
The authors ran a total of 370 tests on the data sets to determine the
relationship between sanctions and re-offense, and the “findings were not
what [they] expected.”231 They had anticipated variation in results but instead
found “striking” consistency: “Only four of the 370 tests show a reduction
in repeat offending and those findings come from one study. Fifty-eight tests
show criminal sanctions are associated with increased amounts of repeat
offending. The predominant finding is that 308 of the tests show no effect,
one way or the other.”232
I have undoubtedly painted a dystopian picture of the system built on
feminists’ victim-based disparity arguments.233 Others may assert different
225
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012). Between 2006 and 2015,
an average of 23% (95,207 of 413,945) of domestic violence simple assaults reported to police resulted
in arrests. See REAVES, supra note 217, at 6.
226
See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611
(2014) (arguing that misdemeanor enforcement has largely moved from an adjudicative model of criminal
justice to a managerial model, where people are “managed” through repeated engagement with law
enforcement).
227
JOEL H. GARNER & CHRISTOPHER D. MAXWELL, THE CRIME CONTROL EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS FOR INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (Sept. 30, 2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/236959.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WM9-2LBP].
228
Id. at 15–16.
229
Id. at 66.
230
Id. at 66, 71.
231
Id. at 94.
232
Id.
233
Several articles discussed above present critical views of domestic violence criminal reform,
including Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 187; Goodmark, Should DV Be Decriminalized?, supra note
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cost-benefit analyses, tout different studies, and have a more sanguine
attitude toward prosecution’s liberatory potential.234 My goal in telling the
domestic violence story is to demonstrate that feminist disparity arguments
and evidence, by design or institutional predisposition, inexorably produced
greater punishment. Whether such carcerality was worth it to secure equality
by some standard and whether punishment is a distributable good that
uniquely measures the worth of minorities and women are different
questions. I have previously answered both with a resounding “no,”235 but
my larger point here is that critical race empiricists who produce disparity
evidence—especially of victim-based disparities—must attend to more than
whether policymakers will accept it. They must grapple with why those
powerful actors would accept it and, in the end, whether such acceptance is
a case of “be careful what you wish for.”
C. A Caution About Victim-Based Racial Disparity
The aforementioned caution may appear less pressing in the racial
rather than the gender context, given that white women have long been the
iconic face of American victimhood. By contrast, police, prosecutors, and
the public at large are strongly resistant to viewing presumptively criminal
black men as victims. A significant number of white Americans regard
victims like Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown as “thugs” and then express
utter outrage at the “racist” suggestion that they believe black lives matter
186; Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism, supra note 186; Suk, supra note 186; and Coker, supra note 222.
See also Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider’s “Murky Middle Ground” Between
Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 427 (2002) (critiquing aggressive policing and prosecution policies on race, gender, and
class grounds.).
234
See, e.g., Jonathan Lippman, Ensuring Victim Safety and Abuser Accountability: Reforms and
Revisions in New York Courts’ Response to Domestic Violence, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1424–27 (2013)
(applauding New York’s adoption of mandatory arrest policies and aggressive prosecution of domestic
abusers); Corinne L. McCann, What Can States Do to Maintain Victims’ Security, Deter Aggressor’s
Repeated Abuse, and Motivate Police Departments to Pursue Criminals in the Domestic Violence
Context?, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 509 (2006) (arguing that states should do more to encourage police
officers to comply with mandatory arrest statutes); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The
Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1739 (calling certain
women critics of domestic violence criminalization “pseudofeminists”); Elie A. Maalouf, Note, Tougher
Measures: How the New Massachusetts Strangulation Law Demonstrates the Need for Stricter Penalties
and “No-Drop” Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Disputes, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 295 (2017)
(arguing in favor of Massachusetts adopting no-drop domestic violence prosecution policies).
235
See Gruber, Distributive Theory, supra note 218 (critiquing American criminal law’s treatment
of punishment as a distributable good); Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 COLO. L.
REV. 129 (2014) (contrasting progressives’ level-down proposals to remedy racial disparities in capital
punishment context with their level-up proposals to remedy perceived gender bias in homicide law);
Gruber, When Theory Met Practice, supra note 172 (critiquing the tendency of left-leaning activists to
selectively embrace criminalization).
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less than white lives.236 Nevertheless, racial justice seekers should remain
skeptical when powerful actors tout widespread black crime victimhood as a
basis for greater policing or tougher prosecution. Unlike with domestic
abuse, where the inter-gendered nature of the crime places the burden of
carceral reform primarily on men (and tangentially on the women in their
lives), most violent crimes are intra-racial.237 This means, as Professor
Kennedy pointed out in the capital context, that “valuing” minority victims
through intensifying criminal policing and punishment has the grave
potential to increase incarceration of minorities overall.238
Of course, state actors theoretically could pursue a Koop-public health
route over an Ashcroft-punitive route. Critiquing leniency toward those who
offend against African-Americans could produce positive developments,
such as de-escalation training and proper criminal and civil accountability
for murderous police officers.239 Nevertheless, this is not a Koop moment,
and emphasizing minority victimhood risks greater police and prosecutorial
presence in the very neighborhoods where they have sown the most mischief.
Right now, the federal government has offered a part-political, part236
See Jonathan Capehart, Pictures Put Trayvon Martin on Trial, WASH. POST (May 28, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/05/28/pictures-put-trayvon-martin-ontrial [https://perma.cc/7VUB-84WB] (blasting defense attorney for releasing “unsavory” images intended
to portray Martin as a “thug”); Jon Swaine, Lawyer Urged Prosecutor After Ferguson Shooting: ‘Do the
Right Thing’ for Police, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/sep/22/ferguson-michael-brown-shooting-prosecutor-email [https://perma.cc/5QSM-JTDX]
(observing that during the prosecution’s investigation of the Michael Brown shooting, a senior
investigator sent an email to the prosecutor describing Brown as a “thug” and stating that all the evidence
supported the officer’s side of the story); Daniel Victor, Why ‘All Lives Matter’ Is Such a Perilous Phrase,
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/us/all-lives-matter-black-livesmatter.html [https://perma.cc/4S6B-MB26] (describing the controversy surrounding the usage of the “all
lives matter” phrase).
237
See ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, NCJ 236018, 13 (Nov. 2011),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZM9-P7LJ] (finding that
between 1980 and 2008, 84% of white victims were killed by Whites and 9% of black victims were killed
by Blacks).
238
See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.
239
See, e.g., Nick Wing, Cops in this City Haven’t Killed Anyone Since 2015. Here’s One Reason
Why., HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2017, 5:45 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/salt-lakecity-police-de-escalation_us_591c9070e4b03b485cae1129 [https://perma.cc/C3W8-27DQ] (discussing
de-escalation training of police in Salt Lake City, Utah). However, policing reformist sentiments might
also converge with commercial interests. The widespread solution to excessive force has been to employ
body cameras, at millions of dollars of costs to local and state governments and millions of dollars of
private profits, with little if no benefit. Amanda Ripley & Timothy Williams, Body Cameras Have Little
Effect on Police Behavior, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/
20/us/police-body-camera-study.html [https://perma.cc/L2UB-YDTM] (despite the fact that the “federal
government has given police departments more than $40 million to invest in body cameras, and state and
local authorities have spent many millions more,” body cameras have shown little effect on police
conduct).
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hysterical response to the “epidemic” of “black-on-black” violence in
Chicago—in President Donald Trump’s words, American “carnage,” for
which he has threatened to “send[] in [the] Fed[s]” to address the problem.240
Invoking racial imagery of Obama’s “hometown,” Trump lamented that
“nobody talks about” the black murder victims.241 During the 2016 campaign,
Trump tweeted about Chicago Bull’s star Dwyane Wade’s cousin’s tragic
killing: “Dwayne [sic] Wade’s cousin was just shot and killed walking her
baby in Chicago. Just what I have been saying. African-Americans will
VOTE TRUMP!”242 Community activists on the ground in Chicago urged
economic, educational, and social interventions, as well as gun control.243 In
response, Trump’s press secretary Sarah Sanders doubled down on racialized
criminality sentiments, stating, “it’s a crime problem . . . [and] crime is
probably driven by morality more than anything else.”244 But even to a
nonracist, a carceral solution might look promising. One African-American
journalist counseled the Chicago black community to make a “tough
choice[],” explaining that “[m]andatory sentencing is a touchy subject for
many African-Americans who fear, justifiably so, that there would be a
disproportionate negative impact on blacks. But don’t the repeat offenders

240
Philip Bump, America’s Big Issue is ‘Black Africans’ Killing Each Other, Sebastian Gorka Says,
WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/10/24/americasbig-issue-is-black-africans-killing-each-other-sebastian-gorka-says
[https://perma.cc/65V4-SDMN]
(criticizing a statistical graph retweeted by Trump); Jeremy Gorner, As Feds Help Chicago on Guns,
Trump Aide Says City’s Crime More About ‘Morality,’ CHI. TRIB. (June 30, 2017),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-federal-agents-gun-crimes-trump-20170630story.html [https://perma.cc/9U3H-PSKQ]; Timothy Mclaughlin & Doina Chiacu, Trump Says He Is
Sending Federal Help to Fight Chicago Crime, REUTERS (June 30, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-trump-chicago/trump-says-he-is-sending-federal-help-to-fight-chicago-crimeidUSKBN19L1JB [https://perma.cc/8W5Z-NANN].
241
Rick Pearson & Monique Garcia, Trump Cites Chicago Gun Violence in Speech, CHI. TRIB. (July
22, 2016, 7:22 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-donald-trump-chicagoviolence-speech-met-0722-20160721-story.html [https://perma.cc/LAA6-N6VT] (covering Trump’s
speech criticizing Obama’s policies and Chicago’s gun violence).
242
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 27, 2016, 9:26 AM), https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/769571710924263424 [https://perma.cc/25SA-VUHW].
243
See Adam Gabbatt, ‘It Won’t Stop the Murders’: Why Chicago’s Activists Oppose Trump’s ‘Gun
Strike Force’, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2017, 7:11 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/jul/10/
chicago-trump-gun-violence-activists [https://perma.cc/2FZ9-J387] (observing grassroots opposition to
Trump’s stance on Chicago’s gun violence); Jonathan Parks-Ramage, These People Dedicate Their Lives
to Ending Gun Violence in Chicago, VICE (Aug. 15, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://impact.vice.com/en_us/
article/zmmnyx/these-people-dedicate-their-lives-to-ending-gun-violence-in-chicago
[https://perma.cc/EM5D-5ZZT] (discussing grassroots approaches to combating Chicago’s gun
violence).
244
See Lincoln Anthony Blades, Trump’s Obsession with Chicago, Explained, TEEN VOGUE (July
6, 2017, 10:27 AM), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/trumps-obsession-with-chicago-explained
[https://perma.cc/G9UA-BGQH].
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responsible for this astounding murder rate of African-Americans cause as
much harm?”245
Elsewhere, racial justice theorists struggle with the self-defense
doctrine, and particularly stand-your-ground (SYG) laws, which have
become a symbol of racial injustice since George Zimmerman, citizen
watchman and “wannabe” cop, was acquitted for stalking and shooting
unarmed black teen Trayvon Martin in Florida, an SYG state.246 The primary
feature of stand your ground is to eliminate the “duty to retreat” from selfdefense law and permit a threatened person to use force even if he can safely
retreat.247 A majority of states, through legislation or common law, adopted
SYG. In 2015, a group of sociologists examined cases from 2005–2013
identified as SYG cases by the Tampa Tribune. Like the Baldus study, they
found that killers of white victims were more likely to be convicted for a
variety of legal reasons.248 The subsequent headlines proclaimed, “‘Stand
Your Ground’ Laws Are Racist, New Study Reveals.”249 The authors,
comparing Florida self-defense law to the “three-fifths compromise,”
suggested a law reform project of “repeal[ing] biased laws that perpetuate
institutionalized racism.”250
After the Zimmerman case, critics frequently asserted that SYG
primarily benefits Whites who kill Blacks. The 2015 study, however, found
only a pro-white-victim bias among the self-defense cases analyzed.
245

Dahleen Glanton, With 500 Homicides in Chicago, Time for African-Americans to Get Tough on
Crime, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 7, 2016, 2:35 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/ctviolence-african-americans-glanton-20160907-column.html [https://perma.cc/SKL2-57V8].
246
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012(1) (West 2014) (Florida self-defense law containing SYG).
For a discussion of the Zimmerman case, see generally Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon
Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013) (using the
Trayvon Martin shooting to examine implicit biases in cases involving self-defense claims) and Aya
Gruber, Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your Ground, 68 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 961 (2014) [hereinafter Gruber, Race to Incarcerate] (observing that concerns over Florida state
actors’ racially based application of the law have virtually evaporated in the face of arguments that SYG
is inherently poor criminal policy).
247
See generally Aya Gruber, The Duty to Retreat in Self-Defense Law and Violence against Women,
in OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (July 2017), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/
oxfordhb/9780199935352.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935352-e-5
[https://perma.cc/ZLB9-T9LP]
[hereinafter Gruber, Duty to Retreat] (discussing the relationship between the duty to retreat in selfdefense law and violence against women).
248
See Nicole Ackermann et al., Race, Law, and Health: Examination of ‘Stand Your Ground’ and
Defendant Convictions in Florida, 142 SOC. SCI. & MED. 194 (2015). The study controlled for five other
variables, including who was the initial aggressor and whether the defendant could have retreated, both
of which were more predictive than victim race.
249
Erin Meisenzahl-Peace, ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws Are Racist, New Study Reveals, VICE (Dec.
1, 2015, 4:15 PM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/nz8pek/stand-your-ground-laws-are-racistnew-study-reveals [https://perma.cc/LSE2-993P].
250
Ackermann et al., supra note 248, at 7.
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Moreover, it did not examine whether Florida self-defense outcomes became
more disparate after adoption of SYG or whether Florida outcomes were
more disparate than those in non-SYG jurisdictions. A few studies of this
nature exist, and they attest that all self-defense case outcomes exhibit race
disparities, but SYG makes these disparities not so much worse as
different.251 In 2012, researcher Jon Roman released a study that compared
justification rates for cases with attributes of the Trayvon Martin case (male
strangers involved in a one-on-one conflict with a gun) in non-SYG and SYG
jurisdictions. The effects were complex. The justification rates of black-onblack killings remained constant. SYG increased the justification rates of
white-on-black killings (from 41.14% to 44.71%) and black-on-white
killings (from 7.69% versus 11.10%), rendering black-on-white killings
more justified than black-on-black killings (11.10% versus 9.94%).
However, SYG most profoundly impacted justification rates for white-onwhite killings, which nearly doubled from 12.95% to 23.58%.252 The most
salient racial effect of SYG was to reduce the privilege afforded to white
victims, which primarily inures to the benefit of white killers.
The 2015 SYG study simply confirmed what Baldus found and Powell
feared: Wherever there is discretion in the criminal system, whether it is a
prosecutor’s decision to seek capital punishment or a jury’s decision that a
defendant acted in self-defense, white victimhood predicts severity. In selfdefense law, decisionmakers resist viewing a white victim as an attacker.
However, emphasizing this victim-based disparity as proof positive that
Florida self-defense law is racist poses risks that were not faced by the LDF
lawyers in McCleskey. In theory, the self-defense disparity could be
addressed through a level-down remedy, for example, encouraging
prosecutors and jurors to more readily regard white victims as threatening
and their attackers as justified (and given Roman’s evidence, the SYG
doctrine might precisely do this). However, the “stand your ground is racist”
argument necessarily prefigures a level-up remedy, where SYG is eliminated
so that defendants who claim self-defense against black and white victims
alike are more likely to be convicted. Now, eliminating SYG may be
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See, e.g., JOHN K. ROMAN, URBAN INSTITUTE, RACE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE, AND STAND YOUR
GROUND LAWS: ANALYSIS OF FBI SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORT DATA 9 (July 2013),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412873-stand-your-ground.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5Y2-NSWG]
(comparing SYG and non-SYG cases with and without attributes that match the Martin case). I discuss
this study at length in Gruber, Race to Incarcerate, supra note 246, at 1007. See also Chandler B.
McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground Laws, Homicides, and Injuries 7 (NBER Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 18187, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18187 [https://perma.cc/DD56UN7V] (finding that “between 28 and 33 additional white males are killed each month as a result of these
laws” but “no evidence . . . [of] an increase in homicides among blacks”).
252
ROMAN, supra note 251.
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warranted for independent symbolic reasons. The doctrine arguably has an
institutionally racist, three-fifths-style character, given its history of
protecting the “true man” from “savages” and its current residence in the
racially fraught gun-loving right wing.253 But, eliminating the defense for
symbolic reasons comes at the cost of potentially increasing convictions of
black defendants.
The interests that converged as the Florida stand-your-ground saga
played out are illuminating. Many race critics called for repeal, which would
make it easier for Florida prosecutors to convict defendants.254 That position
garnered support from gun-control-oriented Democratic legislators and
crime-control-oriented prosecutors. This included the prosecutor in
Zimmerman’s case, Angela Corey, an infamous death penalty proponent
abhorred by abolitionists, social justice advocates, and race critics alike.255
Also critiquing the state of SYG law and policy were feminist and racial
justice supporters of Marissa Alexander, a black woman convicted for
shooting at her estranged abusive husband and his children. She too had been
prosecuted by Corey and attempted unsuccessfully to assert an SYG defense.
Alexander and those in her camp, in diametric opposition to Trayvon Martin
supporters and Florida Democrats, supported the level-down position of
making the Florida SYG law broader and easier to invoke by all defendants,
including minority and female defendants.
Alexander supporters faulted Corey for pursuing charges against
Alexander at all and criticized the judge for denying her immunity from
prosecution under the SYG law’s unusual pretrial immunity provision.256
Alexander called for significant legal reforms, including creating a
presumption in favor of immunity, extending SYG protections to so-called
253
See Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 237, 244–45 (2008) (examining historical portrayals of the “true man” in self-defense law); see
also Gruber, Duty to Retreat, supra note 247, at 12 (discussing laws that forbade “savage” Indians and
Blacks from possessing firearms); David B. Kopel, The Self-Defense Cases: How the United States
Supreme Court Confronted A Hanging Judge in the Nineteenth Century and Taught Some Lessons for
Jurisprudence in the Twenty-First, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293 (2000) (examining turn-of-the-century
Supreme Court “Self-Defense Cases” and concluding that support for no-retreat rules was a response to
harsh murder sentences imposed in federal Indian territory cases).
254
See Gruber, Duty to Retreat, supra note 247, at 13 (discussing the view that SYG is reserved “for
White defendants only”); Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws,
67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 827, 850–55 (2013) (arguing that SYG fosters racism and should be eliminated).
See also Gruber, When Theory Met Practice, supra note 172, at 3217.
255
See Jessica Pishko, Is Angela Corey the Cruelest Prosecutor in America?, NATION (Aug. 16,
2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/is-angela-corey-the-cruelest-prosecutor-in-america/
[https://perma.cc/8CXG-49JY] (discussing several of Corey’s draconian and cruel prosecutorial
decisions).
256
See Bretherick v. State, 170 So. 3d 766, 768 (Fla. 2015) (discussing Florida’s pretrial immunity
process).
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warning shots, and reducing penalties for firearm offenses.257 Alexander’s
efforts won support from state Republicans and the National Rifle
Association (NRA), as well as from public defenders.258 Alexander’s position
won the day, with laws expanding SYG and reducing sentences for certain
firearms offenses—a rare victory for public defenders. However, this leveldown solution to perceived disparity was largely due to the overwhelming
influence of the NRA in the state, and marginalized criminal defendants
elsewhere rarely enjoy such powerful backing.
Preferences for white victimhood can exist whenever defenses and
sentencing regimes give prosecutors and jurors a measure of discretion.
Thus, like Justice Stevens’s “for whites only” critique of capital punishment,
one could advance an argument against the entire self-defense doctrine,
asserting that it is better to have no self-defense than a self-defense stamped
“for those who kill blacks only.”259 If we adopt the program of eliminating
any discretionary doctrine that results in more leniency toward those who
offend against Blacks than those who offend against Whites, no defense is
safe. For victimless crimes, one has grounds to worry about the fate of
alternative sanctions, like diversion, that tend to disproportionately favor
white defendants. Notwithstanding the NRA’s love affair with self-defense,
law-and-order sentiments still rule, and decarceral principles and programs
are perpetually on shaky ground. I thus harbor my own can-of-worms fear,
not that disparity claims will crash the system as Powell prophesized, but
that they will lead to level-up solutions that render minority defendants
vulnerable to increased policing, prosecution, and incarceration.
CONCLUSION
Researchers’ and advocates’ choices matter, and they should be made
with awareness of their potential impact. Legal reform does not ebb and flow
with the best evidence, as Dr. Sherman once hoped. Empirical study and law
reform expend serious political, academic, and financial capital. Carceral
reforms that ride in on a wave of bipartisan support for disparately treated
minority victims may prove difficult or impossible to reverse. Accordingly,
before the wheels are set in motion, one must determine the extent to which
disparity claims have the potential to “lie[] about like a loaded weapon, ready
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an
urgent need.”260 Take stock in the beginning or end up like Justice Powell
who, in his retirement, observed the death penalty become more irrational
257
258
259
260

See Gruber, Duty to Retreat, supra note 247, at 7, 13–16.
Id.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 366 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944).
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and unjustifiable, and realized that it was he who had brought the
“evolutionary process . . . suddenly to an end.”261

261
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 430–31 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Steiker, supra
note 6 (observing that McCleskey effectively foreclosed future challenges to racial discrimination in the
imposition of the death penalty).
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